Bosnia and Herzegovina: Political and security situation

Approximate read time: 14 minutes

The House of Lords is scheduled to consider the following question for short debate on 11 June 2026:

Baroness Helic (Conservative) to ask His Majesty’s government what assessment they have made of the political and security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

1. Background

Ethnic divisions and territorial claims led to a civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) between 1992 and 1995, resulting in the deaths of more than 100,000 people.^[1] The conflict was marked by numerous war crimes, including the murder of between 7,000–8,000 Muslim men and boys in Srebrenica and Zepa in July 1995. This massacre is recognised as a genocide. Further information on the Bosnian war is provided in the House of Lords Library briefing ‘End of the Bosnian War: 25 years on’ (9 November 2020).

Following the Bosnian war, representatives of BiH, Croatia and Yugoslavia (then comprising Serbia and Montenegro) signed a peace agreement in 1995 known as the Dayton agreement or Dayton accords.^[2] This established BiH as a single state comprised of two entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, principally comprised of Bosnia Muslim and Croat-majority areas, and Republika Srpska (RS), principally comprised of Serb majority areas. Both entities have their own president, government, parliament, police and other bodies. In addition to these two entities, the Brčko District in the north-east of the country holds a special separate self-governing status. A three-person collective presidency of BiH was also established. Each of these presidents represent one of the three main ethnic and religious groups in BiH: the Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs.

Since 1995, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC)—a group consisting of 55 countries and agencies including BiH, the UK, the US, Russia, NATO and the UN—has overseen the implementation of the Dayton agreement.^[3] Their purpose is to support the peace process in various ways, including financial assistance, providing troops and directly running operations in BiH.

Responsibility for overseeing the civilian aspects of the Dayton agreement was given to a specially appointed high representative for BiH.^[4] This role sits within the Office of the High Representative for BiH (OHR). The high representative is advised by the steering board of the PIC. Powers of the high representative include imposing laws if legislative bodies fail to do so and removing public officials from office if they violate legal commitments and the Dayton agreement.^[5] The current high representative, Christian Schmidt, resigned in May 2026 but will remain in office until a successor is elected.^[6] Mr Schmidt has been described by some observers as having taken a more “activist” approach as high representative than his predecessor, including using his powers to block legislation promoted by RS leaders.^[7] While former RS president Milorad Dodik, as well as Serbia, Russia and China, have all called for the closure of the OHR, the UK and other countries have continued to emphasise its “vital and legitimate” role.^[8]

Responsibility for the implementation of the military aspects of the Dayton agreement was initially placed with NATO.^[9] Then, in 2004, NATO forces handed over this responsibility to an EU-led force: the European Union Force (EUFOR). The name of this military operation in BiH is known as Operation Althea and remains ongoing. The UK’s participation in Operation Althea ended on 31 December 2020. In April 2025, the UK government said it was open to exploring future opportunities for co-operation.^[10]

BiH applied for EU membership in February 2016 and was granted EU candidate status in December 2022.^[11] The EU Council’s latest annual progress review in December 2025 urged all political actors “to renew the country’s focus on progressing on the EU path and deliver on the necessary reforms”.^[12]

2. Recent tensions

Tensions in BiH have increased in recent years, driven largely by a more assertive separatist agenda in RS under former president Milorad Dodik.^[13] Milorad Dodik was president of RS from 2010 to 2018 and again from 2022 to 2025. He was the Bosnian Serb member of the three-person collective presidency of BiH from 2018 to 2022. The former president’s actions, including threats to withdraw RS from state institutions and opposition to decisions of the high representative, have been viewed by various countries as undermining the Dayton agreement. Secessionist rhetoric, including calls for closer alignment with Serbia, persisted when he returned to power from 2022 to October 2025. This has led to increasing international concern it could lead to a return of the ethnic conflict of the past. For more information on secessionist moves in RS, see the House of Commons Library briefing ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina: Secessionism in the Republika Srpska’ (12 December 2025).

The situation escalated in February 2025 following Milorad Dodik’s conviction for disobeying orders of the high representative.^[14] In response, the RS National Assembly adopted legislation rejecting the authority of state-level judicial and law enforcement bodies in RS.^[15] The high representative described this move by the RS leadership as a “hint at de facto secession”.^[16] Despite receiving a six-year ban from holding public office on conviction, Milorad Dodik defied orders and remained in office until October 2025.^[17] His political influence has continued through allies since then, including current RS President Siniša Karan who has indicated he would continue Milorad Dodik’s policies “with ever greater force”.^[18]

Electoral disputes have further heightened tensions. The November 2025 RS presidential election—won by the current president Siniša Karan—required a partial rerun due to what BiH’s Central Election Commission described as “irregularities”.^[19]

Concerns have also been raised about the protection of human rights in BiH.^[20] Mary Lawlor, special rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, has reported pressure on human rights defenders. The special rapporteur said “human rights defenders are working in a society that is still deeply divided, where institutions are susceptible to political influence, corruption is widespread and patriarchal views remain prevalent”.^[21]

External influence from countries like Russia has also continued to raise concerns, with Russia continuing to support the RS leadership and oppose the high representative.^[22] The Russian Federation expressed its support for RS President Siniša Karan’s election, despite what it described as attempts by external forces to “provoke political destabilisation in [RS] by means of flagrant abuse of the judicial and electoral institutions of [BiH] and the illegal termination of Serbian leader Milorad Dodik’s mandate”.^[23] According to international think tank the European Council on Foreign Relations, “Russia’s main goal in [BiH] over more than two decades has been to keep the state divided and dysfunctional, and to prevent it from developing its own foreign policy”.^[24] For information on Russian relations with BiH, see the House of Commons Library briefing ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina: Secessionism in the Republika Srpska’ (12 December 2025).

Both the UK and US imposed sanctions on Milorad Dodik and other RS politicians and organisations in 2022. The UK sanctions, which included travel bans and asset freezes, were imposed “for their attempts to undermine the legitimacy and functionality” of BiH.^[25] Whilst the UK sanctions remain in place, the US lifted their sanctions on various individuals and entities from the Western Balkans in October 2025, including Milorad Dodik, saying the RS National Assembly had taken “constructive actions” which could improve BiH stability.^[26] Since then, it has been reported that RS leaders have made attempts to strengthen ties with the US government.^[27]

3. UN security council meeting on BiH (May 2026)

The UN security council semi-annual debate on BiH took place on 12 May 2026. Presenting his latest assessment on the implementation of the Dayton agreement in BiH, outgoing high representative Christian Schmidt described the overall security situation in BiH as remaining “stable but fragile”.^[28] However, Mr Schmidt warned that “stability should not be mistaken for institutional health”.^[29] He referred to disagreements over the interpretation and implementation of the Dayton agreement, disrespect for the ruling of the BiH court and deliberate obstructions affecting state institutions. Mr Schmidt also said the leadership of RS had continued to question the territorial integrity of BiH.

During the debate, many country delegates urged respect for the Dayton agreement and expressed support for BiH’s democratic reforms and progress towards EU accession.^[30] Denis Bećirović, chair of the presidency of BiH, spoke critically of the RS leadership, accusing them of securing international support for secession and causing “obstructions” to BiH’s progress towards European and Euro-Atlantic integration amongst other issues.

Serbia’s delegate called for good-faith implementation of the Dayton agreement and reaffirmed respect for BiH’s territorial integrity and support for its European integration.^[31] However, he argued the domestic dynamics in BiH had demonstrated the futility of imposing “politically biased interpretations of the constitutional framework”.

Other delegates, including Croatia and Greece, called for a focus on BiH’s accession to the EU.^[32] The EU representative, speaking as an observer, said EUFOR Althea continued to play a key role in supporting BiH authorities to maintain a safe environment, and urged political actors to renew focus on BiH’s path to EU accession.

Some delegates disagreed over the role of the high representative.^[33] For instance, the US delegate stated the next high representative needed to focus on transferring responsibility for running BiH institutions to local leadership. The Russian Federation representative accused the OHR of being “the main source of instability” in BiH and called for the immediate closure of the OHR. China’s delegate—the security council president for May but speaking in his national capacity—argued that the high representative’s power “should not be prolonged”. In contrast, France’s delegate was among several speakers to have praised Mr Schmidt’s commitment as high representative.

Various delegates, including Panama’s and Pakistan’s representatives, warned against divisive rhetoric, noting that the genocide at Srebrenica had “started with words” that cast certain citizens as threats.^[34] The representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo said “instrumentalisation of identities inevitably rekindles tensions and delays the building of a shared future”. Colombia’s delegate highlighted a need to reject “denialism” and refrain from glorifying atrocity crimes.

Delivering the UK’s statement, ambassador James Kariuki, UK chargé d’affaires to the UN, said BiH’s future could not be “held hostage by divisive politics”.^[35] The ambassador reiterated the UK’s support for a “fully empowered high representative”. He also said the UK remained deeply concerned by the political situation in BiH and urged parties to reject all narratives which could have the effect of deepening divisions.

4. Calls for action and UK government comments

There have been calls for the UK government to take further action in response to risks in BiH, including calls made by the Standing Group on Atrocity Crimes.^[36] The standing group is formed of international lawyers, policy advisers and parliamentarians from a range of parties and groups.^[37]

In October 2025, the standing group published a policy briefing on the critical threats facing BiH.^[38] The group warned that BiH faced real existential risks. This included a prospect of former RS president Milorad Dodik declaring secession; one of the principal factors that contributed to the armed conflict and subsequent atrocities in 1992–95. The group also highlighted concerns about nationalist governments in neighbouring countries continuing to “pursue predatory policies” towards BiH, alongside Russia’s role in “strongly supporting destabilisation”. The standing group called on the UK government to take several actions to mitigate these risks, including deployment of international peace-keeping support to BiH and contributing to independent peace-building initiatives.

In November 2025, the standing group said it welcomed steps taken by the UK government to support sovereignty, peace and security in BiH.^[39] This included investment to help BiH counter Russian disinformation and cyberattacks, as well as the deployment of UK military personnel to strengthen security and resilience on the ground.^[40]

At a UN security council meeting on BiH in October 2025, UK Minister Counsellor Jennifer MacNaughtan stated that the previous year had been marked by “the most significant political crisis in BiH for 30 years”.^[41] She reaffirmed the UK’s support for the mandates of EUFOR Althea, the OHR and BiH’s aspirations for Euro-Atlantic integration.

Most recently, during oral questions in the House of Lords on 2 June 2026, the UK government reaffirmed its commitment to supporting peace and stability in BiH.^[42] Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office minister Baroness Chapman of Darlington noted that, with BiH’s October 2026 elections approaching, the government continued to engage with international partners regarding concerns over increasing anti-Dayton rhetoric, the risk of Islamophobia and other divisive narratives in BiH. Referring to Christian Schmidt’s resignation as high representative and the ongoing search for his successor, the minister emphasised the importance of appointing a candidate capable of bringing communities together and securing continued commitment to the Dayton agreement.^[43]

5. Read more

• House of Commons Library, ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina: What’s behind the change in leadership in the Republika Srpska?’, 19 December 2025; ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina: Dayton agreement and political system’, and ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina: Secessionism in the Republika Srpska’, both 12 December 2025
• House of Lords Library, ‘Western Balkans and the Dayton peace agreement’, 6 October 2023; and ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Dayton agreement’, 9 December 2021
• Memorial Center Srebrenica, ‘Genocide in Srebrenica’, accessed 4 June 2026

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