Table of contents
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The House of Lords is scheduled to debate the following report in Grand Committee on 9 September 2025:
Joint Committee on Human Rights, ‘Accountability for Daesh crimes’, 13 May 2025, HL Paper 121 of session 2024–25
The debate is sponsored by Lord Alton of Liverpool (Crossbench). Lord Alton chairs the Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR).
1. Background to the committee’s inquiry
The JCHR first launched an inquiry into the UK’s response to crimes committed by Daesh, also known as Islamic State, ISIL, or ISIS, in November 2023.[1] The committee set out to explore questions including whether the UK was complying with its obligations to punish genocide, to protect children from trafficking, and to support British nationals, including children, who remained detained in camps in Syria.
However, the committee did not report before the 2024 dissolution of Parliament. Instead, the JCHR’s then chair, Joanna Cherry (then SNP MP for Edinburgh South West), wrote to the previous government highlighting some of the committee’s findings. She also urged the next administration and iteration of the committee to consider “how the UK can satisfactorily comply with its human rights obligations and ensure accountability for Daesh crimes”.[2]
In January 2025, the newly constituted JCHR, under its current chair Lord Alton, launched a successor inquiry on the same subject.[3] This used oral and written evidence collected during the earlier inquiry, together with evidence from a further oral evidence session held in February 2025.[4]
2. What did the committee’s report say?
The JCHR published its report, entitled ‘Accountability for Daesh crimes’, on 13 May 2025.[5] Following an initial overview of the legal framework governing international crimes, the report’s conclusions and recommendations were arranged within three main sections. These focused on investigations of international crimes and challenges to accountability, deprivation of citizenship, and the detention of British citizens in north-east Syria.[6]
The committee’s key findings are summarised below. A full list of the committee’s conclusions and recommendations can be found on pages 32–4 of its report.
2.1 Investigations of international crimes and challenges to accountability
The committee noted the UK government’s formal recognition that Daesh’s acts against the Yazidi people constituted genocide. However, it added that despite this recognition there had been no successful prosecutions of Daesh fighters in the UK for international crimes, including genocide. To “remedy this concerning reality”, the committee recommended several changes to policy and law to achieve greater accountability of Daesh fighters for their crimes. It summarised these as follows:
The focus of the police and the Crown Prosecution Service have been on investigating and prosecuting individuals for terrorism offences, rather than international crimes, which include genocide and war crimes. We call for a fundamental change from an approach focused only on terrorism offences to one that considers terrorism offences alongside international crimes.
At present, domestic law provides for a limited form of jurisdiction over the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The UK authorities can only prosecute these offences where they have been committed by UK nationals, UK residents, or persons subject to service personnel jurisdiction. This leaves an impunity gap. We propose the removal of the nationality and residency requirements to allow for the UK to exercise universal jurisdiction over these international crimes. We propose a series of amendments to the Crime and Policing Bill to provide for universal jurisdiction.
We also call for greater collaboration between UK investigative bodies and cooperation with NGOs and international mechanisms, with the aim of better collecting, preserving, and using evidence.[7]
The proposed amendments to the Crime and Policing Bill would amend the International Criminal Court Act 2001 to provide for the exercise of universal jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and ancillary conduct, in England and Wales and Northern Ireland.[8] At the time of writing the bill is currently awaiting second reading in the House of Lords.
2.2 Deprivation of citizenship
Section 40 of the British Nationality Act 1981 allows the home secretary to deprive a person of British citizenship if they consider it conducive to the public good, including in connection with conduct such as terrorism or war crimes.[9]
The committee noted that although this power was important for public safety, the UK used it “more than almost any country in the world”. In addition, the committee said:
We are concerned that there is insufficient oversight of the use of the power to deprive individuals of their citizenship. We call on the government to provide greater transparency as to the use of this power. In particular, we recommend that the government allows for periodic independent review of the use of this power and for reports to Parliament.[10]
2.3 Detention of British citizens in north-east Syria
The committee urged the government to “provide greater information about Britons that are currently detained in camps and in prisons in north-east Syria (NES)”. It added:
The camps are open-air prisons where thousands of women and children have no access to legal assistance and are faced with starvation, no medical support, and threats of violence. Where there is sufficient evidence that crimes were committed by individuals currently detained in NES, they should be prosecuted.
The situation of children detained in NES is particularly dire. The government’s approach is to only repatriate minors where feasible, and only when those minors are brought to the government’s attention. This risks breaching the rights of the child. The government must make every effort to repatriate them where feasible and as soon as possible.[11]
2.4 Chair’s comment and statement in the House of Commons
Commenting at the time of the report’s publication, Lord Alton said of the inquiry’s focus:
This is not something the UK can simply wash its hands of because it happened overseas. We know that British nationals committed the most horrendous crimes in Iraq and Syria under the Daesh regime and we have a duty to see them brought to justice. To date, no Daesh fighters have been successfully prosecuted for international crimes in the UK and we find this unacceptable.
We want to see more action from the government in identifying the perpetrators, some of whom may have returned to Britain, others likely detained in camps in Syria. This will require better coordination from law enforcement and criminal justice, and also the removal of barriers preventing some prosecutions.
We would also urge the government to recognise the deplorable conditions that children with British citizenship are being held in Syria. It is in the UK’s interest to ensure they do not become a new generation of the radicalised and they must be brought home.[12]
In addition, Tom Gordon (Liberal Democrat MP for Harrogate and Knaresborough) made a statement in the House of Commons, in his capacity as a member of the JCHR, shortly after the report’s publication outlining its key findings.[13]
3. What was the government’s response to the report?
The committee received the government’s response on 4 July 2025 and published it the following week.[14] The substance of the government’s response to the JCHR’s conclusions and recommendations is set out below.
Investigations of international crimes and challenges to accountability
- On the investigation and prosecution of international crimes the government said anyone suspected of taking part in the conflict in Syria or Iraq who returned to the UK “must be investigated by the police to determine if they have committed criminal offences, and to ensure that they do not pose a threat to our national security”.[15] It added there were a “wide range of criminal offences that can be used to prosecute returning foreign fighters”, and that in any prosecutions crown prosecutors “must consider whether evidence is admissible, reliable and credible, and there is no other material that might affect the sufficiency of evidence”. It said these standards “do not differ in a core international crime (CIC) prosecution, and prosecuting terrorism or CIC are not mutually exclusive and can be combined where the evidence presents itself”.
- On amending the International Criminal Court Act 2001 to provide for the UK to exercise universal jurisdiction over the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, the government said it did not agree doing so was “warranted at this time”.[16] It explained the UK’s policy on universal jurisdiction was “based on the principle that investigations and prosecutions should take place close to where crimes occur, allowing for better access to robust evidence and witnesses”. It added the UK also took the position that “whether universal jurisdiction should apply to a particular crime is best approached collaboratively between states through treaties”. Consequently, the government explained “most serious international crimes not covered by our universal jurisdiction policy are generally already subject to the jurisdiction of international courts or tribunals”. It said these were “better placed to prosecute such offences where they are not being dealt with by the relevant domestic authorities”. It added the UK was a strong supporter, in particular, of the International Criminal Court and its “mission to end impunity”.
- On greater collaboration between UK investigative bodies, the government said it did not accept the committee’s assessment there was a lack of cooperation between UK investigative and prosecuting bodies.[17] It explained the War Crimes Unit of the Metropolitan Police and the Crown Prosecution Service jointly chaired the UK War Crimes Network, which was set up in late 2019 to “bring together government departments and civil society to deliver the UK’s ‘no safe haven’ policy for perpetrators of international crimes”. It added the network “ensures regular coordination and cooperation across the UK in the investigation and prosecution of serious international crimes on a national and international level”.
- Furthermore, on cooperation with NGOs and international mechanisms to better collect, preserve and use evidence, the government said it was working bilaterally with Iraq to support a new centre for international judicial cooperation and evidence sharing to develop its processes for receiving and dealing with requests for information, intelligence and evidence. It also said it had signed a memorandum of understanding with the UN International Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIIM), which assists with the investigation and prosecution of individuals complicit in crimes committed during the Syria conflict, including by Daesh. The government also said the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) had directly funded evidence-gathering programmes in Syria which had “resulted in the conviction of several members of Daesh across Sweden, Germany and the Netherlands”.
Deprivation of citizenship
- On greater oversight of deprivation of citizenship orders, the government disagreed with the committee.[18] It maintained there was “sufficient oversight and transparency of the use of the deprivation power” via annual counter-terrorism disruptive powers reports. It also said there was “sufficient independent oversight” of the use of the power by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, with reports following independent reviews published in 2018 and 2024.
Detention of British citizens in north-east Syria
- On providing information on the number of British citizens currently detained in camps and in prisons in north-east Syria, the government said it was “not in a position to comment on exact numbers due to shifting circumstances on the ground, the lack of consular presence, and the range of sources from which information is taken”.[19]
- On prosecuting British citizens involved in Daesh crimes, the government said the prosecution of individuals detained in north-east Syria was “ultimately a matter for authorities under whose jurisdiction the individuals are detained”. On prosecuting individuals who had returned to the UK, the government said the “decision to prosecute is for the independent CPS, and where allegations have been reported to the police and the full code test is met to prosecute, the appropriate charges will be applied”.
- On identifying, locating and potentially repatriating minors, the government said UK consular support was not available within Syria as all British Embassy services in Damascus were suspended. It added, however, that the FCDO was “nevertheless committed to considering every request for consular assistance, including repatriation, from Syria on a case-by-case basis, taking in to account all relevant circumstances”. It said that where “British unaccompanied minors and orphans are brought to our attention, it is government policy to seek to repatriate them where feasible and subject to confirmation of identity and nationality, and any national security concerns”. However, it also cautioned there “remained a high threat from terrorism and widespread political instability” in NES in particular, which “increases the challenge the UK government faces when facilitating these repatriations”.
4. Subsequent developments
4.1 Statement in the House of Commons
Following the government’s response to the report, Tom Gordon delivered a further statement in the House of Commons on 17 July 2025.[20] He said:
I am grateful to the government for engaging with the Joint Committee on Human Rights report, ‘Accountability for Daesh crimes’, and for the response it has provided. There are some areas of welcome agreement; for instance, the government has reiterated its commitment to ensuring justice for survivors. It rightly agrees that where there is evidence of international crimes such as genocide, individuals should be prosecuted for those crimes, not merely for terrorism offences that fail to capture the full horror and scale of what has taken place.
However, let me be clear: for all the government’s assurances, we are still left with the sobering reality that not one single Daesh fighter has yet been prosecuted in the UK for genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes of any sort. The UK is a signatory to the genocide convention; we are one of its founding champions. We cannot continue to rely on theoretical commitment to it, while outsourcing accountability to other jurisdictions, or to international courts with limited reach and resources. The government’s response repeatedly emphasises that prosecutions are best pursued “close to where crimes occur”, but where that is not happening—and in many cases it is not—the UK cannot, and must not, turn a blind eye. If a British national takes part in genocide abroad and returns to the UK, they should face justice here. There must be no safe haven for perpetrators of international crimes, especially not on UK soil.
Mr Gordon also said he was “disappointed” that the government had rejected the recommendation to amend the International Criminal Court Act 2001 to remove the limitations regarding prosecutions for international crimes based on nationality and residency. He continued:
What is recommended is not a radical departure from established practice. This is about closing a clear loophole that allows perpetrators of genocide and other international crimes to escape justice simply because of where they are from. The UK exercises universal jurisdiction for torture, and for grave breaches of the Geneva conventions, so why not for genocide? This is not just a legal oversight; it is a failure of political will that continues to undermine survivors’ access to justice. The government claims that sufficient coordination exists between the Crown Prosecution Service and the war crimes team, but despite the structures having been in place since 2019, we are yet to see any meaningful outcomes. Structures alone are not enough. Survivors want justice, not process. Coordination must be measured by results, and so far, the result is zero prosecutions for international crimes.
Mr Gordon concluded by commenting on the government’s response to the JCHR’s recommendations on deprivation of citizenship orders and British nationals held in north-east Syria:
I am also deeply concerned by the government’s stance on citizenship deprivation. The assertion that there is sufficient transparency does not hold up to scrutiny. The public deserve regular, accessible reporting, and Parliament deserves the ability to scrutinise use of this powerful and exceptional tool. Deprivation of citizenship should never be a substitute for due process, or a way of quietly absolving ourselves of responsibility for British nationals being involved in atrocity crimes overseas.
Finally, I come to British nationals, including children, detained in north-east Syria. We note the government’s repeated statements about the practical challenges, and I acknowledge the complexity of the security environment, but the absence of precise public data, the slow pace of repatriation, and the ambiguity around the next steps on those detained and potential prosecutions remain deeply troubling. These children are British nationals. Some are orphaned, and others are at risk of radicalisation and violence. Leaving them in indefinite limbo in unsafe camps is a moral and strategic failure. The UK should lead with humanity, clarity and resolve.
4.2 House of Commons International Development Committee report
In June 2025 the House of Commons International Development Committee published a report in which it recommended the government seek the same amendments to the International Criminal Court Act 2001 via the Crime and Policing Bill as the JCHR had proposed.[21]
Speaking to the proposed new clauses during the Crime and Policing Bill’s report stage in the House of Commons, the committee’s chair, Sarah Champion (Labour MP for Rotherham), said they would allow authorities in England and Wales and Northern Ireland to prosecute people suspected of the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes without any requirement for them to have a connection to the UK. However, the new clauses were not added to the bill during these proceedings.
Photo by Kyle Glenn on Unsplash
References
- Joint Committee on Human Rights, ‘Accountability for Daesh crimes’, 13 May 2025, HL Paper 121 of session 2024–25, p 4. Return to text
- Joint Committee on Human Rights, ‘Letter from Joanna Cherry to Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon’, 28 May 2024. Return to text
- Joint Committee on Human Rights, ‘New inquiry into Daesh crimes: Has the UK met its human rights obligations?’, 13 January 2025. Return to text
- Joint Committee on Human Rights, Accountability for Daesh crimes: Oral evidence transcripts, accessed 15 August 2025; and ‘Accountability for Daesh crimes: Written evidence’, accessed 15 August 2025. Return to text
- Joint Committee on Human Rights, ‘Accountability for Daesh crimes’, 13 May 2025, HL Paper 121 of session 2024–25. Return to text
- As above, p 32–4. Return to text
- As above, p 1. Return to text
- As above, pp 35–6. Return to text
- House of Lords Library, ‘Deprivation of Citizenship Orders (Effect during Appeal) Bill’, 24 July 2025, p 1. Return to text
- Joint Committee on Human Rights, ‘Accountability for Daesh crimes’, 13 May 2025, HL 121 of session 2024–25, p 1. Return to text
- As above, p 2. Return to text
- Joint Committee on Human Rights, ‘Daesh fighters must not escape British justice, JCHR report warns’, 13 May 2025. Return to text
- HC Hansard, 15 May 2025, cols 181–3WH. Return to text
- Joint Committee on Human Rights, ‘Accountability for Daesh crimes: Government response’, 11 July 2025, HC 1211 of session 2024–25. Return to text
- As above, p 2. Return to text
- As above, pp 3–4. Return to text
- As above, pp 4–6. Return to text
- As above, p 7. Return to text
- As above, pp 7–9. Return to text
- HC Hansard, 17 July 2025, cols 492–3. Return to text
- House of Commons International Development Committee, ‘Protection not permission: The UK’s role in upholding international humanitarian law and supporting the safe delivery of humanitarian aid’, 12 June 2025, HC 526 of session 2024–25, pp 24–5 and 57–8. Return to text