Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Tianjin: China’s plans for global governance

Approximate read time: 15 minutes

The House of Lords is scheduled to consider the following question for short debate on 16 October 2025:

Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston (Crossbench) to ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the challenges presented to the international order by the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation following the recent summit held in Tianjin.

1. What is the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation?

Founded in Shanghai, China, in 2001, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is an international intergovernmental organisation. While the SCO was originally made up of six member states (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) it has subsequently expanded. In 2017 India and Pakistan joined, Iran joined in 2023 and Belarus in 2024.^[1] In addition, the organisation includes two observer states (Afghanistan and Mongolia) and 14 dialogue partners (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Bahrain, Egypt, Cambodia, Qatar, Kuwait, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Sri Lanka).^[2] Initially the SCO was primarily a regional security cooperation mechanism for Central Asia; however, it has now enlarged to include countries across three continents.^[3]

The stated aims of the SCO are:^[4]

• to strengthen mutual trust, friendship and good neighbourliness between the member states
• to encourage the effective cooperation between the member states in such spheres as politics, trade, economy, science and technology, culture, education, energy, transport, tourism, environmental protection, etc
• to jointly ensure and maintain peace, security and stability in the region
• to promote a new democratic, fair and rational international political and economic international order

The structure, objectives and functioning of the SCO are contained in its charter, adopted on 7 June 2002 in St Petersburg, Russia. The charter has been amended through successive protocols.^[5] The key decision-making body of the SCO is the council of heads of states (CHS) which meets once a year. In addition, the council of heads of government (prime ministers) (CHG) meets once a year to discuss the strategy and priority areas within the SCO and approve the organisation’s budget. There are also mechanisms for meetings in other areas such as foreign affairs, economy and trade, health, education and energy.^[6]

In addition to the role for member states, observer states and dialogue partners, the SCO has emphasised the importance of cooperation with international and regional organisations, such as the United Nations, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Commonwealth of Independent States.^[7]

The SCO has also stressed the importance of the “Shanghai spirit” in its actions, which it describes as mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for diversity of civilisations and pursuit of common development. The organisation argues that in its external actions, it upholds non-alignment, non-targeting at other countries or regions and the principle of openness.^[8]

Member states of the SCO collectively represent over 42% of the world’s population.^[9] In addition, International Monetary Fund data shows that in 2023 the 10 SCO member states accounted for over 23% of global GDP.^[10] The official languages of the SCO are Russian and Chinese.^[11]

Dr Jeremy Garlick, writing for the EU-funded European Hub for Contemporary China research project, argues the SCO has “considerable impact” and should be thought of as a sister organisation to the BRICS organisation comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. He states the SCO enhances Russian and Chinese influence in the global south as it gives leaders from economically developing nations who are members, observers or dialogue partners the opportunity to personally attend summits where Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping are central figures. He contrasts this with the G7, which, he argues contains only developed nations and “pointedly excludes global south nations”.^[12]

Writing for Chatham House, Dr Yu Jie has said while the SCO started with a focus on resolving border disputes between central Asian states, it has now “evolved into a forum aimed at projecting a non-western alternative worldview”.^[13]

2. What happened at the recent Tianjin summit?

China hosted the most recent SCO summit in the northern port city of Tianjin between 31 August and 1 September 2025. As well as the 25th meeting of the council of heads of state for member states, the summit included an ‘SCO plus’ meeting with observer states, dialogue partners and guest countries.

Leaders from 23 countries and the heads of 10 international organisations attended. Guest countries invited included Laos, Malaysia and Vietnam. In addition, United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres and representatives of bodies such the ASEAN and the Commonwealth for Independent States attended.^[14] The event was described by President Xi Jinping of China as the “largest ever” in the SCO’s history.^[15]

The outcomes of the summit were detailed in the Tianjin declaration, which was signed and issued by member states at its conclusion. The contents of the declaration and other announcements included:^[16]

• Approval of an ‘SCO development strategy for the next 10 years (2026–2035)’ to “further improve the construction of the SCO and ensure peace, stability, development and prosperity in the SCO region”.^[17]
• Top-level agreement for an SCO development bank. The idea was first proposed by China in 2010, although it has previously been opposed by Russia. However, there was agreement in principle by SCO finance ministers and central bank governors earlier this year and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi listed it as an outcome from the summit which had “finally come to fruition”.^[18] Chinese media have emphasised the potential of the SCO development bank to help resource-rich member states finance their infrastructure development, and to accelerate economic integration between China and Central Asia and strengthen the presence of China’s belt and road initiative throughout Eurasia. Media in Iran and Russia have also noted the potential to circumvent western sanctions through the bank.
• A global governance initiative (GGI).^[19] Announced by President Xi of China at the SCO plus meeting, the initiative aims to push back against a “cold war mentality, hegemonism, and protectionism”. China argues the initiative follows five principles of “adhering to sovereign equality”, “abiding by international rule of law”, “practising multilateralism”, “advocating a people-centred approach” and “focusing on taking real actions”. Priority areas were identified as reform of international financial architecture, artificial intelligence (AI), cyberspace, climate change, trade, and outer space.^[20] The Financial Times was among outlets to describe the GGI as representing President Xi’s “vision for an alternative to the US-led postwar global order”.^[21] The GGI follows a global development initiative, global security initiative and global civilisation initiative launched in 2021, 2022 and 2023, respectively.^[22]
• Establishment of “four security centres” with signed agreements on an SCO centre for countering security challenges and threats, an information security centre, a centre for combating transnational organised crime and an anti-drug centre. China said this aimed to advance SCO security cooperation and “more effectively safeguard regional peace and stability”.^[23]
• The establishment of six cooperation platforms, open to all SCO member states. President Xi announced China would establish platforms in areas including energy, green industry and the digital economy.^[24]
• Changes in SCO structure by merging observer states and dialogue partners into “SCO partners”. Laos also joined the SCO as a partner.^[25]

Referencing the GGI, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said after the summit “the monopoly of global governance by a few countries must not continue”.^[26]

The summit was followed by a large-scale military parade in Beijing to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of the second world war in Asia.^[27]

3. What have commentators said about the summit?

Writing for Chatham House, Dr Yu Jie argued the SCO summit was one of the measures used by China to cast itself “as the standard-bearer of a multipolar world led by the global south, set against the western narrative of a US-led liberal international order”.^[28] Dr Yu also contrasted China’s introduction of its ‘global governance initiative’, and earlier initiatives on global development, security and civilisation, with US President Donald Trump’s move to withdraw the United States from many UN-led multilateral organisations.

This theme was picked up by Dr Samir Puri, also writing for Chatham House, who said the summit allowed China to present itself as “a paragon of stability” when “US foreign policy is anything but”. He said established structures of global governance, such as the UN, were “struggling to adapt to a more multipolar reality”. Commenting on proposals by China for a new global governance initiative, he called the details “scarce” but quoted Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi who has said that the initiative was “designed to firmly support the central role of the UN in international affairs”.^[29]

Dr Aleksei Zakharov, writing for the New Delhi-based Observer Research Foundation, contended that while the SCO had expanded, geographical expansion may make it harder for agreement to be reached in key areas. He noted “many states of the global south may be willing to stay within the SCO orbit without taking on any additional commitments”.^[30]

In contrast, Henrietta Levin from the US-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies argued that while the diversity of SCO member states limits the organisation’s capacity for concrete action, its size “bolsters the argument China is making to the world”. The argument in this instance being that Chinese leadership and President Xi are “a widely welcomed corrective to Washington’s capricious foreign policy”.^[31]

Other examples of attempts to alleviate the impacts of western countries’ foreign policy are proposals from Iran to institute a financial mechanism to counter western sanctions on SCO members. Iran has previously proposed a similar financial mechanism under the BRICS group of nations.^[32]

Of particular press interest in the run up to the summit was the expected attendance of Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi, who visited China for the first time in seven years for the summit, as well as President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin’s expected attendance. BBC Monitoring highlighted coverage in Russia of the SCO summit and Russian-Chinese talks which gave the impression Russian ties with China were deepening, and that the west had failed to isolate Russia.^[33] In addition, the visit of Prime Minister Modi emphasised a thaw in ties between China and India, which have both found themselves in a similar position in relation to tariffs imposed by the United States. BBC News suggested the “downturn in Delhi’s relations with Washington has prompted India to rediscover the utility of the SCO”.^[34]

4. What has the UK government said about the summit?

In answer to a recent parliamentary question about the impact of the meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in Tianjin, the government noted:

The UK is not part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation but closely monitors international events. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s summit resulted in numerous outcomes for participating states. This included the Tianjin declaration, which does not contain any mention of Russia’s war against Ukraine.

We will never shy away from challenging China’s political and military backing for Russia. We urge the Chinese government to impress on Putin the need to end the war immediately by withdrawing Russian forces from Ukraine and ceasing his illegal attacks.

More broadly, our approach to China is clear. We will cooperate where we can and we will challenge where we must—never compromising on our national security, and recognising the complexity of the world as it is.^[35]

5. Read more

• Dr Samir Puri, ‘It may take a generation for a stable new world order to emerge’, Chatham House, 8 September 2025
• King’s College London, ‘From rivalry to realignment: China, India and Russia at the SCO’, 5 September 2025
• Dr Yu Jie, ‘China is using the SCO summit and Victory Day parade to showcase its vision of a new world order’, Chatham House, 2 September 2025
• Economist (£), ‘Xi Jinping’s anti-American party’, 2 September 2025
• Financial Times (£), ‘Xi Jinping to host Vladimir Putin and Narendra Modi as China presents rival front to US’, 30 August 2025; and ‘Xi Jinping outlines China’s ambition to reshape world order in showpiece summit’, 1 September 2025

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Cover image from Wikimedia Commons.