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On 25 March 2026, the House of Lords is scheduled to debate the Northern Ireland Scrutiny Committee’s report on ‘Northern Ireland after Brexit: Strengthening Northern Ireland’s voice in the context of the Windsor Framework’ (15 October 2025, HL Paper 182 of session 2024–26).

1.  Committee report

The House of Lords Northern Ireland Scrutiny Committee was appointed in January 2025.[1] It launched its first inquiry in March 2025, looking at Northern Ireland’s voice in the context of the Windsor Framework, including the structures and mechanisms through which Northern Ireland politicians, officials and stakeholders can engage with the Windsor Framework, and how successful those structures and mechanisms had been in promoting Northern Ireland’s voice at a UK and EU level.[2] The committee said it would take full account of the evidence published by the former House of Lords European Affairs Sub-Committee on the Windsor Framework in May 2024. The Windsor Framework Sub-Committee had begun an inquiry on strengthening Northern Ireland’s voice in the context of the Windsor Framework.[3] However, the sub-committee ceased to exist when Parliament was dissolved for the 2024 general election.

The Northern Ireland Scrutiny Committee published its report in October 2025.[4]

1.1 Mapping the institutional architecture

The committee said it had heard “compelling evidence that the labyrinthine complexity of the institutional architecture of the Windsor Framework makes it impossible for stakeholders to navigate”.[5] The committee illustrated the complexity of these arrangements with a diagram (see pages 24–5 of the report) setting out the numerous bodies, institutions and processes across the EU, UK government, UK Parliament, Northern Ireland executive and Northern Ireland Assembly and elsewhere that have some mechanism for feeding into the governance of the Windsor Framework. The committee recommended the government should clarify the functions and operations of these bodies and institutions, ensure this information was communicated clearly to stakeholders, and consider urgently whether the “plethora” of bodies involved in these processes could be reduced.[6] It also recommended the government should engage with the EU to bring greater transparency to the workings of the UK-EU bodies of the Windsor Framework.

The committee reported that the business community in Northern Ireland had experienced particular difficulties arising from the lack of clarity about which EU laws apply in Northern Ireland, especially in the absence of a centralised public register.[7] The committee noted that the former Windsor Framework Sub-Committee had repeatedly recommended that the government should monitor regulatory divergence within the UK (between Great Britain and Northern Ireland) and between the UK and the EU.[8] The committee reiterated the sub-committee’s call for the government to maintain an up-to-date record of regulatory divergence and its impact on Northern Ireland.[9] It said this was “vital” for businesses and the public to understand which laws apply to them in Northern Ireland. It recommended the government should create a ‘one stop shop’, such as a hotline, for businesses to access this information.

1.2 UK-EU structures

The committee looked at joint UK-EU bodies set up under the Withdrawal Agreement and the original Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland—the overarching UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement Joint Committee, the Specialised Committee on the Implementation of the Windsor Framework (one of six specialised committees under the Joint Committee), and the Joint Consultative Working Group and its sub-groups, which sit under the Specialised Committee.[10]

The committee said it welcomed “attempts to integrate stakeholder consultation into this structure” but it concluded there was “still work to be done to ensure that engagement is formalised, transparent and meaningful”.[11] For instance, it recommended that engagement with citizens and businesses by the co-chairs of the Joint Committee—a commitment made in the UK-EU political declaration signed when the Windsor Framework was agreed in 2023—should take place promptly and should happen regularly in future.[12] It also recommended that the government should engage with the Northern Ireland Executive Office to ensure that Northern Ireland ministers are able to participate fully in Joint Committee meetings.[13] Other recommendations from the committee focused on formalising engagement by the Specialised Committee with businesses, civil society organisations and equality and human rights bodies, and on how the Joint Committee and the Specialised Committee could address North-South issues.[14]

The committee also considered the Stormont brake, a mechanism the UK and the EU agreed as part of the Windsor Framework in 2023. It sets out a process for the Northern Ireland Assembly to object to an EU act that amends or replaces an act that already applies Northern Ireland under the Windsor Framework, subject to a series of conditions.[15] In December 2024, unionist parties in the Northern Ireland Assembly sought to trigger the Stormont brake in relation to EU rules on the classification, labelling and packaging of hazardous substances.[16] However, Hilary Benn, secretary of state for Northern Ireland, assessed that the conditions for pulling the brake had not been met.

The committee concluded that the Stormont brake is “a highly political topic”.[17] It noted that some witnesses had questioned its effectiveness and suggested it had been “oversold”.[18] The committee urged the government to “be more transparent about the function of the Stormont Brake so that it can be used productively as a mechanism for promoting dialogue between the Northern Ireland Assembly and the UK government”.[19] The committee also encouraged the government to engage with the Northern Ireland Executive and the EU at an early stage on matters with potential implications for Northern Ireland “so that detrimental impacts can be mitigated or avoided”.[20]

1.3 UK initiatives

The committee considered various bodies and mechanisms arising from the ‘Safeguarding the union’ command paper. This was published in January 2024 following a deal reached between Rishi Sunak’s government and the DUP to restore Northern Ireland’s devolved institutions, which had not been fully functioning since February 2022 because of the DUP’s objections to the operation of the Northern Ireland Protocol (the precursor to the Windsor Framework).[21]

The committee invited the government to respond to concerns raised by witnesses about the effectiveness of the East-West Council and the transparency and longevity of the UK government-Northern Ireland Executive working group.[22] The committee recommended that Intertrade UK should be a forum for businesses to raise issues and potential solutions relating to trade within the UK internal market.[23] It said the government should consider including businesses from across the UK in the membership of Intertrade UK.

One of the measures the government introduced following the ‘Safeguarding the union’ command paper was the ‘applicability motion’ procedure. This is an internal UK mechanism which applies when there is a proposal to add a new EU law to the list of those that apply to Northern Ireland under the Windsor Framework.[24] This is different from the Stormont brake, which applies when EU laws that already apply to Northern Ireland are amended or replaced. Before the UK government can agree with the EU in the Withdrawal Agreement Joint Committee that a new EU act should apply to Northern Ireland, the Northern Ireland Assembly must pass an applicability motion indicating cross-community consent. However, in the absence of an applicability motion being passed, the UK government can agree to a new EU law applying in Northern Ireland if it considers there are “exceptional circumstances” or the new EU act would not create a regulatory border between Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

The committee noted that several witnesses had raised concerns about the government’s decision to add new EU acts to the annexes of the Windsor Framework without engaging the applicability motion procedure, and in one case where an applicability motion had not passed with cross-community consent.[25] The committee regretted that the government had published its reasoning for adding these new EU acts to the Windsor Framework only five days before the relevant Joint Committee meeting, leaving limited time for UK parliamentary scrutiny. It recommended that the government should improve its engagement with Parliament and the main Northern Ireland political parties before Joint Committee meetings where such decisions would be taken.[26]

The Windsor Framework Democratic Scrutiny Committee (DSC) was established as a standing committee of the Northern Ireland Assembly following the ‘Safeguarding the union’ white paper. Its functions include examining and considering new EU acts and replacement EU acts, and conducting inquiries and publishing reports in relation to replacement EU acts.[27] When the EU formally publishes an act that amends or replaces an existing EU act that applies to Northern Ireland under the Windsor Framework, the DSC has five working days to decide whether to undertake an inquiry. If it does so it must publish its report no later than 15 working days before the end of the two-month scrutiny period that begins with the EU’s publication of the act.[28]

The House of Lords Northern Ireland Scrutiny Committee noted agreement among its witnesses that the timescales to which the DSC has to operate were too tight.[29] It recommended the government should reassess them. It said this was “essential if the DSC is to fulfil its important assigned responsibilities”. The committee also recommended the government should revisit the DSC’s terms of reference to allow it to undertake wider thematic inquiries rather than only being able to focus on the impact of specific EU legislative reforms.[30] It also called on the government urgently to improve the level and detail of information the government provided to the DSC and to allow the DSC to take evidence from UK government officials.

1.4 Northern Ireland engagement with the EU

The committee also considered ways in which Northen Ireland politicians, officials and stakeholders can engage directly with the EU, noting that political and official-level engagement “largely takes place within the context of wider UK engagement with the EU”.[31] It called on the government to respond to concerns that Northern Ireland stakeholders “are currently insufficiently able to engage constructively with the European Union at an early stage of the EU’s legislative process”. It also asked the government to respond to some witnesses’ calls for greater resources for the Northern Ireland Executive Office in Brussels and to explain how it would ensure (while being mindful of the devolution settlement) that the UK’s Mission to the EU (UKMis) and the Northern Ireland Executive Office would work closely together to ensure that the views of Northern Ireland stakeholders were heard effectively at an early stage of the EU’s legislative process.[32]

The committee concluded that the UK-EU ‘reset’ and the commitment to ‘decision-shaping’ in areas of dynamic alignment meant that “efforts to influence the EU process may now be led by the UK government”. Following a UK-EU summit in May 2025, the government is negotiating with the EU to conclude a sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) agreement, to link the UK and EU emissions trading schemes, and to establish UK participation in the EU’s internal electricity market. The two sides have agreed that in these policy areas, the UK would dynamically align to relevant EU law and contribute to ‘decision-shaping’ in a way appropriate to a non-EU member state.[33] The committee concluded that this “raises further questions about how Northern Ireland’s interests will be represented at a UK level”.[34]

2.  Lord Murphy’s independent review of the Windsor Framework

As the committee was conducting its inquiry, Lord Murphy of Torfaen was also carrying out an independent review of the Windsor Framework. The government commissioned him to undertake this review following the first democratic consent vote in the Northern Ireland Assembly.[35] The Windsor Framework provides for the Northern Ireland Assembly to hold periodic votes on whether articles 5–10 of the framework should continue to apply.[36] The first such democratic consent vote was held in December 2024. A majority of the Assembly voted in favour of the continued application of the framework, but there was not cross-community support.[37] If a democratic consent vote passes by a simple majority but without cross-community support, the government must commission an independent review to consider the implications of the Windsor Framework and the application of EU law on social, economic and political life in Northern Ireland.[38]

The government published Lord Murphy’s review in September 2025.[39] Lord Murphy said he had tried to put forward only those suggestions that could command cross-community support.[40] His first set of recommendations related to the “ongoing ‘democratic deficit’” where there were “still some gaps in how Northern Ireland can meaningfully influence the EU laws that apply to it”, despite the Windsor Framework’s “partial mitigation” of issues identified under the original Northern Ireland Protocol.[41] Lord Murphy’s recommendations under this heading were as follows:[42]

  • The Democratic Scrutiny Committee should be allowed ten working days (in practice two weeks) to decide whether to hold an inquiry into an EU act.
  • Additional expert staffing should be made available to advise the Democratic Scrutiny Committee.
  • There should be more coordination between Whitehall and Belfast in advising the Democratic Scrutiny Committee, and Northern Ireland civil servants should be empowered to provide good and appropriate advice.
  • There should be additional capacity and support from the UK government for the Northern Ireland civil service and the Democratic Scrutiny Committee itself to facilitate access to timely and relevant information, better use of the Executive’s office in Brussels, and expanded engagement with Northern Ireland stakeholders.
  • The UK government should continue to work transparently with all Northern Ireland parties regarding the functioning of the Stormont brake and related mechanisms, acknowledging and addressing the impacts of EU legislation on Northern Ireland.
  • Further Northern Ireland civil service staff should be seconded or added to the Northern Ireland Executive Office in Brussels, especially to deal with new EU regulations.
  • The UK government should look to broaden its inclusion of stakeholders into the meetings of the various UK-EU fora.

The second set of recommendations concerned business and trade-related aspects of the Windsor Framework. Some of these recommendations were also relevant to subjects covered by the committee’s report. For instance, Lord Murphy recommended that:[43]

  • Businesses in Northern Ireland and Great Britain should be constantly engaged about both progress and timelines for any future UK-EU SPS agreement.
  • The UK government should work to make Windsor Framework related guidance accessible in a single ‘all-in-one service’ and do more to signpost businesses, especially small to medium sized businesses, towards this support.

The committee welcomed the publication of Lord Murphy’s review.[44] The committee said its report “amplifies some of the recommendations made in his report, particularly in relation to addressing the democratic deficit and the timing and resourcing constraints” under which the DSC operates.[45] The committee found “considerable consistency” between its own conclusions and Lord Murphy’s.

3.  Windsor Framework Democratic Scrutiny Committee response to the committee report

The Northern Ireland Assembly Windsor Framework Democratic Scrutiny Committee (DSC) responded to the committee’s recommendations (and Lord Murphy’s recommendations) in November 2025.[46]

The DSC welcomed the intention of the recommendation to provide it with more time to carry out its functions. However, rather than extending the time in which it must decide whether to hold an inquiry, the DSC asked the government to increase the overall time available for it to carry out its functions and to adjust accordingly the deadline for making a notification under the Stormont brake mechanism.

In response to the committee’s recommendation about broadening the DSC’s terms of reference, the DSC said it already had the ability to consider wider evidence which may be related to, and provide context for, its consideration of proposed and published EU acts, and to carry out thematic inquiries so far as they relate to its purpose and functions.

The DSC supported the committee’s recommendations calling on the government to improve the level of information it provides to the DSC and to maintain a record of regulatory divergence and its impact on Northern Ireland.

It rejected a recommendation from the committee that the government and Northern Ireland Assembly consider changing the DSC’s status from a standing committee to a statutory committee. It argued that becoming a statutory committee would not give the DSC additional powers, and the DSC was already established in statute so could not be abolished by the Assembly.

4.  Government response

The government published its response to Lord Murphy’s review in December 2025.[47] The government said it accepted all his recommendations.[48] The government also addressed some of the Northern Ireland Scrutiny Committee’s recommendations in its response to Lord Murphy’s review.

The government committed to changing the timescales for DSC inquiries into replacement EU acts.[49] Noting that Lord Murphy, the Northern Ireland Scrutiny Committee and the DSC itself had all made different recommendations about this change, the government said it was “content to afford the DSC greater discretion over the timelines that apply to its work within the existing two month democratic scrutiny period”. It said it would make these changes when parliamentary time allows. Amendments to schedule 6B of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 will be required.

In response to representations from Lord Murphy, the committee and the DSC about the need for more Whitehall-Belfast coordination, the government said it would develop a new triage process to identify EU proposals of possible relevance to the Windsor Framework at an earlier stage, where possible. To build on this, it would also put in place a new set of written policy commitments to support the engagement of Northern Ireland departments with EU legislation of relevance.

The government said it remained committed to working transparently with all Northern Ireland parties regarding the functioning of the Stormont brake and related mechanisms.

Responding to Lord Murphy’s recommendation about broadening the inclusion of stakeholders in meetings of UK-EU fora and the committee’s recommendation about formalising such engagement, the government said it had established a new Northern Ireland Business Stakeholders Group on the Windsor Framework (NIBSG). It had held an open application process and expanded the representation of a number of sectors including the horticultural and haulage sectors. The government said there would be formal engagement on a quarterly basis, with informal engagement on relevant issues between the formal meetings. The government also said the Cabinet Office and the Northern Ireland Executive Office would undertake a mapping exercise to ensure there was more consistent representation of government departments and Northern Ireland departments across the various UK-EU fora going forward.

The government committed to establishing a ‘one stop shop’ facility for Windsor Framework guidance and support. It said this would go beyond the information available on the GOV.UK website and would include an AI online goods advisor to summarise relevant rules for businesses moving goods, a ‘business concierge’ online portal to guide businesses through the steps they need to take and a new second-line Northern Ireland Trade Resolution Centre to provide a point of contact to resolve complex issues. The government said the ‘one stop shop’ service would “help guide businesses through trading across the full breadth of the UK market and on how they can benefit from Northern Ireland’s dual market access”. The government said the service would be backed by the £16.6mn funding package announced in the budget in November 2025 and would begin operation within the next financial year. The chancellor announced a £16.6mn “UK internal market package to smooth trade across the Irish Sea” to support the ‘one stop shop’ service and to provide £2.25mn to Intertrade UK.[50]

The government also published a response to the committee’s report in February 2026.[51] It said it welcomed the constructive proposals made by the committee, which it had in part addressed in its response to Lord Murphy’s review.[52]

On stakeholder engagement, the government repeated some similar points to those it had already made in its response to Lord Murphy’s review, for instance on setting up the NIBSG and a ‘one stop shop’ service.[53] Given the funding it was directing to the ‘one stop shop’ service, the government said it would not develop a UK database of EU rules as it believed this would not “deliver the same value that a significantly enhanced support offer for SMEs could from the funding available”.[54] It suggested that organisations could use freely available services, such as the EU’s EUR-Lex tool, to read detailed EU legal texts. The government said it would give “further consideration” to the committee’s recommendation that Intertrade UK should be a forum for businesses to raise issues and could include members from across the UK.[55] The government said it had funded three additional posts to expand capacity in the Office of the Northern Ireland Executive in Brussels to conduct institutional engagement on EU regulations applicable to Northern Ireland. The government said it would separately consider the committee’s recommendation for Northern Ireland civil servants to be seconded to UKMis.

In response to points made in the committee’s report about the transparency of UK-EU bodies, the government said it “considers that there is transparency in decision making under the Windsor Framework”.[56] For instance, it emphasised that Northern Ireland’s first and deputy first minister have a standing invitation to form part of the UK delegation to Joint Committee meetings, and Northern Ireland officials can attend and speak in all the formal Windsor Framework structures that sit under the Joint Committee.

Responding to the committee’s recommendations about formalising joint engagement by the UK and EU with civil society and equality and rights organisations, the government said it worked with Queen’s University Belfast (QUB) to “ensure the input of a broad range of civil society stakeholders into its work on the Windsor Framework”.[57] It added that equality and rights stakeholders played an important part in the government’s civil society engagement, including in joint UK-EU engagement. It said that joint UK-EU engagement took place with business groups in the NIBSG and the civic society organisations convened by QUB before every Specialised Committee meeting.

The government said it would continue to provide information on the effects and impacts of EU regulatory files before Joint Committee meetings where decisions were being taken on whether to add them to the Windsor Framework.[58] In terms of ensuring Northern Ireland stakeholders were involved at an early stage of the EU legislative process, the government set out opportunities available to stakeholders to respond to consultations published online by the UK and by the EU. The government said it was up to private organisations to decide whether to respond to EU consultations and up to EU institutions to consider this feedback.[59] The government added that it would “continue to listen carefully to the representations made to it directly”.[60]

5.  Follow-up inquiry

The committee has launched a short follow-up inquiry to examine some of the announcements made in the government’s responses to its report and to Lord Murphy’s review.[61] The committee has heard evidence from business stakeholders on the ‘one stop shop’, the new Northern Ireland Business Stakeholder Group and general issues in relation to business experience and engagement with the Windsor Framework. It has also asked the government for an update on progress in establishing the ‘one stop shop’ and engagement with businesses as part of this work.[62]


Cover image by maddock1238 on Pixabay.

References

  1. House of Lords Northern Ireland Scrutiny Committee, ‘New Northern Ireland Scrutiny Committee established’, 31 January 2025. Return to text
  2. House of Lords Northern Ireland Scrutiny Committee, ‘Lords committee announces inquiry on Northern Ireland’s voice in context of Windsor Framework’, 13 March 2025. Return to text
  3. House of Lords Windsor Framework Sub-Committee, ‘Strengthening Northern Ireland’s voice in the context of the Windsor Framework’, accessed 16 March 2026. Return to text
  4. House of Lords Northern Ireland Scrutiny Committee, ‘Northern Ireland after Brexit: Strengthening Northern Ireland’s voice in the context of the Windsor Framework’, 15 October 2025, HL Paper 182 of session 2024–26. Return to text
  5. As above, pp 30–1. Return to text
  6. As above, p 31. Return to text
  7. As above, p 4. Return to text
  8. See House of Lords European Union Affairs Committee, ‘Report from the Sub-Committee on the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland: The Windsor Framework’, 25 July 2023, HL Paper 237 of session 2022–23, p 62 and House of Lords Library, ‘Scrutiny of EU legislation within the scope of the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland’, 10 January 2023, section 4.2. Return to text
  9. House of Lords Northern Ireland Scrutiny Committee, ‘Northern Ireland after Brexit: Strengthening Northern Ireland’s voice in the context of the Windsor Framework’, 15 October 2025, HL Paper 182 of session 2024–26, p 37. Return to text
  10. For a diagram setting out this structure, see Northern Ireland Assembly, ‘Governance of the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement and Windsor Framework’. Return to text
  11. House of Lords Northern Ireland Scrutiny Committee, ‘Northern Ireland after Brexit: Strengthening Northern Ireland’s voice in the context of the Windsor Framework’, 15 October 2025, HL Paper 182 of session 2024–26, p 5. Return to text
  12. As above, p 41. Return to text
  13. As above, p 42. Return to text
  14. As above, pp 42 and 48. Return to text
  15. For further information about the operation of the Stormont brake, see Northern Ireland Assembly, ‘The Stormont brake’, accessed 16 March 2026, and House of Lords Library, ‘Windsor Framework (Democratic Scrutiny) Regulations 2023 and the Stormont brake’, 24 March 2023. Return to text
  16. House of Lords Northern Ireland Scrutiny Committee, ‘Northern Ireland after Brexit: Strengthening Northern Ireland’s voice in the context of the Windsor Framework’, 15 October 2025, HL Paper 182 of session 2024–26, p 53. Return to text
  17. As above, p 59. Return to text
  18. As above, pp 5 and 59. Return to text
  19. As above, p 5. Return to text
  20. As above, pp 10 and 60. Return to text
  21. For further information, see House of Commons Library, ‘Safeguarding the union: Progress in implementing the Windsor Framework’, 4 December 2024. Return to text
  22. House of Lords Northern Ireland Scrutiny Committee, ‘Northern Ireland after Brexit: Strengthening Northern Ireland’s voice in the context of the Windsor Framework’, 15 October 2025, HL Paper 182 of session 2024–26, pp 66 and 70. Return to text
  23. As above, p 67. Intertrade UK is a non-statutory advisory body established by the UK government to advise on and promote trade within the United Kingdom (HM Government, ‘Intertrade UK’, accessed 19 March 2026. The commitment to establish Intertrade UK was made in the ‘Safeguarding the union’ command paper. Return to text
  24. For further information about applicability motions, see Northern Ireland Assembly, ‘Applicability motions’, accessed 16 March 2026. Return to text
  25. House of Lords Northern Ireland Scrutiny Committee, ‘Northern Ireland after Brexit: Strengthening Northern Ireland’s voice in the context of the Windsor Framework’, 15 October 2025, HL Paper 182 of session 2024–26, pp 71–3. Return to text
  26. As above, p 73. Return to text
  27. Northern Ireland Assembly, ‘Windsor Framework Democratic Scrutiny Committee: About the committee’, accessed 16 March 2026. Return to text
  28. Northern Ireland Assembly, ‘The Windsor Framework Democratic Scrutiny Committee’, accessed 16 March 2026. Return to text
  29. House of Lords Northern Ireland Scrutiny Committee, ‘Northern Ireland after Brexit: Strengthening Northern Ireland’s voice in the context of the Windsor Framework’, 15 October 2025, HL Paper 182 of session 2024–26, p 77. Return to text
  30. As above, p 78. Return to text
  31. As above, p 79. Return to text
  32. As above, pp 91–2. Return to text
  33. House of Lords Library, ‘Resetting the UK-EU relationship: House of Lords European Affairs Committee report’, 19 February 2026. Return to text
  34. House of Lords Northern Ireland Scrutiny Committee, ‘Northern Ireland after Brexit: Strengthening Northern Ireland’s voice in the context of the Windsor Framework’, 15 October 2025, HL Paper 182 of session 2024–26, p 93. Return to text
  35. House of Commons, ‘Independent review of the Windsor Framework (HCWS358)’, 9 January 2025. Return to text
  36. Northern Ireland Assembly, ‘What is the democratic consent mechanism?’, accessed 17 March 2026. Return to text
  37. Northern Ireland Assembly, ‘Motion: Democratic consent resolution’, 10 December 2024. Return to text
  38. Northern Ireland Act 1998, schedule 6A, part 6. Return to text
  39. Lord Murphy of Torfaen, ‘Independent review of the Windsor Framework’, September 2025. Return to text
  40. As above, p 28. Return to text
  41. As above, p 29. Return to text
  42. As above, p 38. Return to text
  43. As above, p 39. Return to text
  44. House of Lords Northern Ireland Scrutiny Committee, ‘Northern Ireland after Brexit: Strengthening Northern Ireland’s voice in the context of the Windsor Framework’, 15 October 2025, HL Paper 182 of session 2024–26, p 64. Return to text
  45. As above, p 5. Return to text
  46. House of Lords Northern Ireland Scrutiny Committee, ‘Letter from Ciara Ferguson MLA, DSC chair re: Recommendations in the independent review of the Windsor Framework and the House of Lords Northern Ireland Scrutiny Committee report’, 28 November 2025. Return to text
  47. Cabinet Office, ‘Government response to the independent review of the Windsor Framework’, 16 December 2025. Return to text
  48. Northern Ireland Office, ‘UK government accepts all recommendations from the independent review of the Windsor Framework in a landmark commitment’, 16 December 2025. Return to text
  49. Cabinet Office, ‘Government response to the independent review of the Windsor Framework’, 16 December 2025. Return to text
  50. HM Treasury, ‘Reeves backs Northern Ireland business and public services at budget’, 26 November 2025. Return to text
  51. House of Lords Northern Ireland Scrutiny Committee, ‘Government response to Northern Ireland after Brexit: Strengthening Northern Ireland’s voice in the context of the Windsor Framework’, 6 February 2026. Return to text
  52. As above, p 1. Return to text
  53. As above, pp 2–4. Return to text
  54. As above, p 3. Return to text
  55. As above, p 4. Return to text
  56. As above, p 5. Return to text
  57. As above, p 6. Return to text
  58. As above, p 7. Return to text
  59. As above, pp 8–9. Return to text
  60. As above, p 8. Return to text
  61. House of Lords Northern Ireland Scrutiny Committee, ‘Follow-up inquiry on strengthening Northern Ireland’s voice in the context of the Windsor Framework’, accessed 17 March 2026. Return to text
  62. House of Lords Northern Ireland Scrutiny Committee, ‘Letter from Lord Carlile of Berriew to Rt Hon Hilary Benn MP (Secretary of State for Northern Ireland) and Rt Hon Nick Thomas-Symonds MP (Cabinet Office Minister) re government response to committee report’, 4 March 2026. Return to text