Transnational repression in the UK: Joint Committee on Human Rights report

Approximate read time: 20 minutes

The House of Lords is scheduled to debate the following motion on 26 February 2026:

Lord Alton of Liverpool (Crossbench) to move that this House takes note of the report from the Joint Committee on Human Rights ‘Transnational repression in the UK’ (7th Report, HL Paper 160).

1. Background: Transnational repression in the UK

1.1 Definitions

The Joint Committee on Human Rights has argued that there is currently no single accepted definition of transnational repression in the UK.^[1] However, the committee has argued that it is generally understood to include instances of intimidation, violence and harassment by a state against people in another state. The committee said that human rights activists, journalists and political opponents deemed to be a security threat could all be at risk from foreign governments that seek to suppress dissent.

Similarly, the government has said that it recognises transnational repression as a term to describe certain foreign state-directed crimes against individuals.^[2] It explained that this activity can take place both physically and online, with examples including intimidation, surveillance, harassment, forced/coerced return, abduction, and even assassination. The government argued that the issue can undermine an individual’s ability to exercise their freedoms and human rights. It also said that transnational repression is a matter of national sovereignty and national security.

1.2 Examples of transnational repression

In recent years, both the government and non-governmental organisations have raised concerns about the prevalence of transnational repression in the UK and provided examples of what it can look like. For example, in a statement to the House of Commons in May 2025, Dan Jarvis, minister for security, said that recent instances of transnational repression included:^[3]

• the targeting of Iran International, an independent TV network, in 2023^[4]
• Hong Kong authorities targeting individuals for exercising their right to freedom of expression by issuing bounties under the National Security Law
• the poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal in Salisbury in 2018

A 2025 Freedom House report on transnational repression claimed that between 2014 and 2024, seven countries were responsible for 11 incidents of physical transnational repression in the UK.^[5] It said these included documented assaults, assassination attempts, and credible threats which were likely to “represent only a fraction of all the cases that occurred”. In particular, the report highlighted allegations made against the Chinese government, including that in 2022 it had set up three “unofficial police service stations” in the UK to “harass individuals from China and even force them to return home”. The report also noted an incident in October 2022 where China’s consul general in Manchester, Zheng Xiyuan, “dragged a Hong Kong pro-democracy protester onto the grounds of the Chinese consulate and viciously attacked him”.

Amnesty International has also claimed that Chinese and Hong Kong students studying in the UK have been intimidated, harassed and silenced by Chinese authorities as part of a pattern of transnational repression.^[6] In addition, Reporters Without Borders have warned that the UK has become a hotspot for attacks against Iranian journalists.^[7]

The government has also recently warned about state actors’ targeting of academic staff and students and published guidance on protecting higher education from such interference.^[8]

Section 2.3 of this briefing contains further examples of transnational repression and information on the countries that the Joint Committee on Human Rights has identified as the main perpetrators in the UK.

2. Work of the Joint Committee on Human Rights

2.1 Committee inquiry

In January 2025, the Joint Committee on Human Rights launched an inquiry focused on transnational repression in the UK.^[9] The committee said it would look at how transnational repression affects the human rights of people living in the UK and explore if enough support and protection is available to groups deemed at particular risk of harm. It said it would also examine the effectiveness of the government’s response to transnational repression and the effectiveness of policies and frameworks intended to prevent it.

The committee received both written and oral evidence, copies of which can be found on the UK Parliament website. Some of the evidence was given anonymously.

2.2 Key findings

The committee published its report ‘Transnational repression in the UK’ on 30 July 2025. Setting out its findings, the committee argued that transnational repression risks “undermining the UK’s ability to protect the human rights of its citizens and those who have sought safety within its borders”.^[10] It said it was “deeply concerning to hear increasing reports of foreign governments moving beyond their own national borders to persecute people in the UK”.

The committee said it had received credible evidence that a number of states had engaged in acts of transnational repression on UK soil.^[11] It argued that these actions had had a serious impact on those targeted, “instilling fear, limiting their freedom of expression and movement, and undermining their sense of safety”.

2.3 Countries of concern

2.3.1 Overview

As part of its inquiry, the committee received evidence that many states had conducted transnational repression activities on UK soil.^[12] Multiple submissions accused the following states of such activities: Bahrain, China, Egypt, Eritrea, India, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. The committee highlighted that a substantial number of evidence submissions were personal accounts of transnational repression perpetrated by Eritrea.

The committee said that witnesses had placed China, Russia and Iran as the “three most flagrant” perpetrators of transnational repression in the UK.^[13] It noted that all three had imposed sanctions on UK parliamentarians, including two members of the committee, in what it alleged was “a deliberate attempt to deter scrutiny and suppress criticism”.

2.3.2 China

Focusing on China, the committee said that witnesses had described a broad range of tactics, including surveillance, online harassment and threats to family members abroad.^[14] It said that China had also placed ‘bounties’ on several individuals and sent threatening communications to neighbours in an attempt to isolate them. In addition, the committee highlighted concerns about the operation of unofficial Chinese “police stations” in the UK, which have allegedly been used to monitor and pressure members of the Chinese diaspora. Concerns were also expressed that the proposed new Chinese embassy in London, which has since been approved, could serve as a base for further surveillance and intimidation activities.^[15]

2.3.3 Russia

The committee said it had received evidence on Russian misuse of Interpol red notices and strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) “to intimidate and silence journalists, activists and other critics”.^[16] It also said that commentators had highlighted Russian use of the “most serious forms of transnational repression”, including actions that pose a direct threat to life. The Salisbury nerve agent attack on former Russian double agent Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia was highlighted, with a witness to the committee’s inquiry arguing that such actions can create a “chilling effect” amongst critics of the Russian state.^[17]

2.3.4 Iran

The committee found that Iran represented “one of the highest kidnap and assassination state threats to the UK”.^[18] It said that tactics reportedly used have included assassination plots, physical attacks, intimidation of family members, asset freezing, judicial proceedings, smear campaigns, online abuse, surveillance and digital attacks such as hacking, doxing and impersonation.^[19] The committee also reported that both the Iranian intelligence services and proxy organisations have conducted transnational repression activities in the UK.^[20] In addition, it said that the volume of transnational repression reports involving journalists covering Iran was “a particular cause for concern”. On this issue, Reporters Without Borders told the committee that along with physical attacks, female Iranian journalists have been subjected to gendered and sexualised abuse.

2.3.5 Eritrea

The committee said that a substantial number of submissions it received from witnesses related to Eritrea.^[21] It highlighted evidence given by Martin Plaut, a journalist and visiting senior research fellow at King’s College London, who described how state-sponsored ‘festivals’ have been used as “mechanisms to monitor, intimidate and exert control over members of the Eritrean diaspora”. The committee also heard that members of this community have been forced to pay a 2% ‘diaspora tax’ to the Eritrean government. In written evidence, the UN Special Rapporteur on Eritrea has said that those who refuse to pay are “considered government opponents and face harassment, intimidation and ultimately social isolation”.

2.4 Key recommendations and government responses

2.4.1 Overview

The committee made 22 recommendations in its report which it split into four areas: definition and legal framework, policing and support for victims, Interpol and visa applications, and departmental coordination and diplomatic policy. In its report summary, the committee gave an overview of its findings in these four areas and set out its key recommendations. These are summarised below with the government’s replies as set out in its response to the committee’s report published on 30 October 2025.^[22]

In its response to the committee, the government highlighted that since the submission of its evidence, the Defending Democracy Taskforce (DDTF) had concluded its comprehensive review into transnational repression.^[23] The government explained that for security reasons, neither the review itself nor its recommendations would be made public.^[24] However, it said the review had found that the UK maintained “a hard operating environment” for states wishing to conduct transnational repression. It also reported that the UK had “robust tools and a system-wide safeguards” in place to counter the threat, including the National Security Act 2023.

2.4.2 Definition and legal framework

The committee argued that despite the seriousness of the threat posed by transnational repression, “the UK currently lacks a clear strategy” to address the issue.^[25] The committee said that there is no clear definition of transnational repression and that the government does not routinely collect data on the issue. Focusing on this, it argued that understanding the scale and nature of the threat is essential to formulating effective and proportionate responses. The committee therefore recommended that the government adopt a formal definition of transnational repression and establish data collection and monitoring mechanisms.

In response, the government set out its current understanding of the term transnational repression (TNR). It said that:

TNR is a matter of national security and national sovereignty, but also about undermining an individual’s ability to exercise their rights and freedoms. The UK recognises TNR as a term to describe certain foreign state-directed crimes against individuals. This activity can take place both physically and online, with examples including intimidation, surveillance, harassment, forced/coerced return, abduction and even assassination at the most serious end of the scale.^[26]

The government argued that this description “captures the totality of the issue and the full spectrum of threats” and was designed to encourage reporting. It also said that its current “flexible approach” enabled effective collaboration with likeminded partners and that it wanted individuals to feel confident reporting any incidents without needing to consider if their experience met a strict definition.^[27] However, the government said it would continue to keep its approach under review, including the “potential utility of further explanatory materials or guidance” to ensure all relevant bodies are aligned in their understanding of what constitutes transnational repression.

On the committee’s recommendation that police forces should be asked to collect relevant data on the number and nature of transnational repression reports in the UK, the government said that it recognised the importance of robust data and evidence.^[28] It said it was taking active steps to improve data collection and that a key focus of the defending democracy taskforce’s review was to understand the scale and nature of transnational repression in the UK. The government explained that this work had included identifying methodologies and patterns of behaviour associated with transnational repression. It said that a dedicated team had been established in the Home Office to coordinate with law enforcement and other partners to strengthen the understanding of this work.

In addition, to further support data collection, the government said policing had established a system for the reporting of crimes that include reference to foreign interference. It explained that the collection and aggregation of this data was part of a developing process and would assist policing and the government in developing a more detailed understanding of reported activity. It said this work would assist the development and review of strategy and interventions. The government argued that this evolving approach aligned with the committee’s recommendation.

2.4.3 Policing and support for victims

The committee argued that police officers “often lack the training necessary to respond effectively to transnational repression” and that this resulted in inconsistent and ineffective support for victims.^[29] It therefore called for specialised training for police officers on the early warning signs of transnational repression and for the creation of a dedicated reporting line for victims.^[30]

On police training, the committee recommended that:

The government should regularly evaluate the uptake of the new police training on transnational repression. Updates on participation rates should be provided to the committee every six months. If uptake remains limited, serious consideration should be given to making this training mandatory for all police officers. Police should also be given training on early warning signs of TNR-related risks, such as intimidation of friends and family members abroad.^[31]

Responding, the government set out its current approach to police training.^[32] It said that police forces provide updates on the delivery of awareness and guidance on a quarterly basis and that this focuses on the number of officers and staff who complete online modules on the National Security Act 2023, foreign interference awareness, and security. It also highlighted work to review and update training modules and noted that training is mandatory for all counter-terrorism police officers as they are responsible for investigating state threat incidents. The government said that it considered its current approach to be proportionate:

Our response is designed to be adaptable and threat-led, ensuring that officers most likely to encounter TNR-related activity are equipped with the necessary tools and awareness. We remain committed to ensuring that police officers are able to identify and respond to early warning signs of state-directed activity.^[33]

On the committee’s recommendation for a dedicated national reporting hotline for individuals who experience transnational repression, the government said that it believed such a line would be “duplicative and potentially cause confusion”.^[34] It argued that there was a risk that it would be unclear what number individuals should call and when and that such a system could also undermine the clarity and effectiveness of existing mechanisms. The government also said that due to the targeted and specific nature of the issue, expected call volumes would be low, and the resource investment required to establish and operate a separate hotline would not be proportionate. In addition, the government argued that a dedicated hotline would reinforce perceptions that transnational repression is “widespread and ubiquitous, which could inadvertently spread fear, encourage false reporting, or be misused as a surveillance tool”.

2.4.4 Interpol and visa applications

An Interpol red notice is a request issued to law enforcement worldwide to locate and provisionally arrest a person pending extradition, surrender or similar legal action.^[35] It is based on an arrest warrant or court order issued by judicial authorities in the requesting country and member countries apply their own laws in deciding whether to arrest a person.^[36]

The committee said it was “deeply concerned” about the use of red notices by certain member states.^[37] It argued that refusal by the Interpol secretariat to acknowledge that there is a problem and take remedial action posed a “significant threat to the rights and freedoms of individuals targeted by authoritarian regimes and sends a message that this behaviour is acceptable”. It therefore called on the government to put pressure on Interpol to reform procedures and call out serial abusers:

We recommend the government works with ‘Five Eyes’ and other partners to track and expose malicious, vexatious, and politically motivated use of red notices by member states. In doing so, the government should advocate for greater transparency and accountability within Interpol’s procedures and advocate for the use of corrective measures and suspensions for systematic abusers of Interpol mechanisms.^[38]

Responding, the government said that it was aware of the potential for misuse of red notices, and other international routes, to have arrest warrants actioned.^[39] It said that it would continue to work with the National Crime Agency, which acts as the UK’s national central bureau for Interpol, to monitor the effectiveness of existing safeguards. However, the government also said that if it were made aware of confirmed cases of Interpol misuse, it “would not hesitate to raise it with Interpol’s leadership”. In addition, the government noted the checks red notices go through and the stages at which they can be removed for being non-compliant or breaching Interpol’s constitution and said that Interpol takes private action against states found to be misusing its systems.

The committee also proposed that the government consider introducing a formal mechanism by which the Home Office or the National Crime Agency could alert individuals to the existence of a red notice where there is a strong basis to believe it has been politically motivated.^[40]

Responding, the government argued that it “would not be appropriate for the UK, or any member state, to check on behalf of individuals, or inform individuals, as to whether they are wanted by other states, as we cannot intervene in the judicial process of other sovereign nations”.^[41] However, it also reiterated that it would report any confirmed cases of misuse to Interpol and highlighted that individuals can already request access to, or removal of, their data via Interpol’s independent oversight body, the Commission for the Control of Interpol’s Files.

2.4.5 Departmental coordination and diplomatic policy

Referring to transnational repression as a “serious and under-recognised threat”, the committee argued that it requires urgent and coordinated international action.^[42] As a result, it urged the government to work with like-minded states to support efforts to elevate transnational repression as a priority issue on the UN agenda and to promote coordinated international action against its use by authoritarian regimes.

In response, the government said it was committed to working with like-minded international partners, through bilateral and multilateral channels, to raise awareness of the issue and strengthen collaboration and resilience to transnational repression.^[43] For example, it noted a multilateral meeting the UK had co-chaired with the US in October 2024 which focused on addressing state-sponsored high-harm physical threats and other forms of transnational repression. The government also highlighted various other work on the issue, including that at the June 2025 G7 leaders’ summit, the prime minister supported the first G7 statement on transnational repression.^[44]

2.5 Further correspondence

In October 2025, Lord Alton of Liverpool, chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, wrote to the home secretary, Shabana Mahmood, about the government’s response to the committee’s report on transnational repression.^[45] Lord Alton said that the committee was encouraged by the “constructive responses to some of the key recommendations”. He said these included those that dealt with data collection and evidence, training for police and work across government to coordinate responses to the issue. However, he also said that the committee was “disappointed in several areas where the government did not accept our recommendations”. He said that the committee was therefore requesting further clarification as to why the government had deemed that no further action was necessary in the following areas:

• outreach and support for victims
• the foreign influence registration scheme
• strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs)

In December 2025, Dan Jarvis, minister for security, wrote to Lord Alton setting out the government’s responses to the 15 questions posed in his letter.^[46]

3. Read more

• Amnesty International, ‘UK has ‘become a hunting ground for authoritarian regimes’’, 30 July 2025
• House of Commons, ‘Written statement: Transnational repression review (HCWS632)’, 14 May 2025; and Home Office, ‘Guidance: Transnational repression’, 14 May 2025
• Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, ‘The Russian way in transnational repression’, King’s Centre for the Study of Intelligence, 20 January 2025
• Observer and Tortoise, ‘Londongrad: Iran’s hit squads’, May 2023

---

Image by Kris from Pixabay