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Approximate read time: 20 minutes

The House of Lords is scheduled to debate the following motion on 29 January 2026:

Baroness Featherstone (Liberal Democrat) to move that this House takes note of the role of UK development partnership assistance in diplomacy, conflict resolution and the exercise of soft power.

1. UK soft power

1.1 Definitions

The Oxford Dictionary of Politics and International Relations defines soft power as a term used “to denote the use of economic, cultural, and diplomatic incentives so as to shape the preferences of other actors in the international system”. It continues:

This form of ‘soft persuasion’ is often contrasted with the notion of hard power, which predominately focuses on the use of economic sanctions, military threats, and military deployment as a means to coerce compliance.[1]

The US-based Council on Foreign Relations has said that in practice, soft power “entails countries projecting their values, ideals, and culture across borders to foster goodwill and strengthen partnerships”.[2]

1.2 Index rankings

There are various soft power indexes available from organisations such as thinktanks, private enterprises and international organisations.

An International Monetary Fund (IMF) working paper from 2024 noted that soft power is “difficult to measure directly and existing indicators—mostly subjective and not always transparent—fail to take into account the multidimensional nature of soft power”.[3] The authors proposed a new index which measured 29 indicators over six dimensions from 1990 to 2021. In 2021 the UK ranked eighth of 193 countries and its soft power was assessed to be declining over time.[4]

The consultancy firm Brand Finance’s ‘Global soft power index’ is based on surveys across countries, judging each country through a number of metrics (such as diplomatic influence, arts and cultural reach, and technology and innovation) to assess their non-coercive influence on “preferences and behaviours of various actors in the international arena”. It ranked the UK fourth in its soft power rankings for 2026, behind the United States and then China and Japan.[5] China overtook the UK in the rankings for the first time in 2025, when the UK ranked third.[6]

In its 2026 assessment, Brand Finance stated:

Western nations account for a disproportionate share of the decline. The US, UK, Germany, and France all record sharper-than-average drops, reflecting growing scepticism about their ability to deliver on long-standing promises of stability, prosperity, and leadership.[7]

The British Council’s ‘Global perceptions 2025’ report reached similar conclusions. Based on surveys of young people aged 18 to 34 in G20 states, it ranked the UK third overall for ‘overall attractiveness’ and concluded:

‘Global perceptions 2025’ reveals a world in flux. The dominance of western democracies in soft power is no longer assured. While they remain broadly attractive and trusted, their lead is narrowing. The rise of East Asian and Global South states—especially Japan, Republic of Korea, China, and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia—signals a decisive shift toward a more multipolar global order.[8]

The Indian Strategic Studies Forum also released a ‘World soft power index’ in 2023.[9] It used a survey-based methodology which ranked the UK third after the USA and France.[10]

1.3 UK Soft Power Council

The government launched a 26-member Soft Power Council in January 2025 to act as an advisory board on UK soft power. This was announced in partnership between the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) and the Department for Culture, Media and Sport. In a press release about the launch, the government stated:

The UK ranks in the top three across all major soft power indices, with global affinity for our culture and creative industries, sport, education and institutions. The soft power which these represent are a hugely important driver of UK economic growth and security. They deepen our relationships, build alliances and enhance our global influence. But, until now, there has been no mechanism to coordinate and amplify these sectors’ impact.

The newly established council will identify opportunities across the sectors and industries represented where closer working with government can advance our broader growth and security objectives. It will drive greater impact through government campaigns and a systematic approach to the global foreign policy, cultural and sporting calendars.[11]

In March 2025 the government said the Soft Power Council would “help shape and drive a new soft power strategy for the UK”.[12]

1.4 Committee inquiries

The House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee launched an inquiry on UK soft power in January 2025. The committee explained this inquiry would likely run across the parliament, with multiple outputs, and would consider:[13]

  • What advantages soft power brings to the UK.
  • The UK’s soft power strengths, including a focus on diplomacy, post-conflict reconstruction, commitment to the rules-based international order, culture and media, education and trade and the economy and education.
  • How the UK’s soft power might be compared to allies and “adversaries” around the world. The committee noted that China, India, Russia and Turkey had invested significantly in their soft power offerings and the inquiry would therefore consider what the UK’s “USP” (unique selling point) might be.

Committee chair Dame Emily Thornberry (Labour) commented:

The UK is a world leader when it comes to soft power, punching well above our weight. The UK is largely seen as a force for good, and a fair and balanced voice on the world stage […] The British values of liberalism, tolerance and respect for the rule of law are emulated across the world.

While soft power is one of the UK’s greatest strengths, we can’t afford to be complacent. Countries such as China, Russia and India are building up their soft power offer in the form of diplomatic, educational and cultural exchanges, and have shown they will fill any gaps left by the UK and other like-minded countries moving on. While the UK has successfully made the case for democratic values in the past, new, competing narratives seek to undermine this.[14]

The committee held an oral evidence session in March 2025. Giving evidence, Jonathan McClory, a consultant and former creator of the ‘Soft power 30 index’, described some of the soft power characteristics of development assistance:

Aid serves several different purposes in terms of soft power or foreign policy. It is an important diplomatic signal of your values and, one could argue, of your moral character. Secondly, particularly in very difficult, unstable places, it is about trying to create some stability. Thirdly, it is about relieving some suffering for groups of people facing extreme hardship.[15]

Mr McClory also said the amount of money being spent was a reflection of ‘hard power’ or “economic largesse”.[16] He held the view that cuts to aid spend would have a marginal impact on soft power and said he understood the ‘logic’ of redirecting funds to defence and security in the current circumstances.

In 2014, a House of Lords committee on soft power made a number of recommendations for the then coalition government to increase its focus on soft power. These can be found in the full committee report: House of Lords Soft Power and the UK’s Influence Committee, ‘Persuasion and power in the modern world’ (28 March 2014, HL Paper 150 of session 2013–14). However, in summary, the committee’s recommendations included:[17]

  • strengthening the UK’s embassy network and networks such as the Commonwealth
  • analysing how soft power can link with ‘hard power’ (defence) and the UK’s work on post-conflict reconstruction in countries such as Afghanistan
  • linking soft power deployment and support to UK exports, enterprise and other innovative capacities

On development assistance, it said the government should “ensure that departments are sufficiently resourced to deliver British aid in a way that supports the UK’s soft power, because false economies here will result in aid spending that fails to deliver benefits for the UK in the long run”.[18] The report also said “the promotion of British values through the funding of international development projects can yield significant soft power gains”.[19] It continued:

Aid helps the UK to connect with recipient individuals, with the governments with which it collaborates, and with publics overseas when it contributes to projecting a vision of the UK as a helpful and generous nation that can provide expertise in effective international development […][20]

The report also noted that “by encouraging and promoting stability, British aid should also help to prevent future conflict within and between states”.[21]

2. Reductions in development assistance spending

The coalition government made a commitment to spend 0.7% of gross national income (GNI) on official development assistance (ODA) from 2013 and the International Development (Official Development Assistance Target) Act 2015 later set the commitment as a statutory duty. The UK spent 0.7% of GNI on ODA between 2013 and 2020 in line with the duty. However, in 2020 the then Conservative government announced a temporary reduction in ODA spend to 0.5% of GNI from 2021, as permitted under the 2015 act. The government cited economic challenges arising from the Covid-19 pandemic as the reason for the reduction.[22]

The ODA:GNI ratio later temporarily increased to 0.51% and 0.58% in 2022 and 2023 respectively due to increased ODA spending within the UK associated with supporting refugees, known as ‘in-donor’ costs.[23]

In February 2025 the current Labour government announced it would reduce ODA spending further to the equivalent of 0.3% of GNI by 2027 to fund an increase in defence and security spending.[24] Anneliese Dodds resigned as minister for international development following the announcement.[25] The House of Commons Library noted this would bring UK ODA spending to its lowest level since 1999.[26]

In July 2025 the government confirmed it was “committed to restoring ODA spending at the level of 0.7% of GNI as soon as fiscal circumstances allow”.[27] It continued:

The principles for a return will be met when, on a sustainable basis, the government is not borrowing for day-to-day spending and underlying debt is falling. We will monitor future forecasts closely against these tests. The latest forecast from the Office for Budget Responsibility indicates that the tests will not be met in this parliament. The government is working hard to create the conditions to enable the ODA fiscal tests to be met by prioritising growth—stronger growth will help in time to get underlying debt down.

The government published its latest statistical release on UK ODA spend, covering the 2024 calendar year, in September 2025.[28] The release included the following ‘key headlines’ about UK ODA in 2024:

  • UK ODA spend was £14,082mn, a decrease of £1,262mn (8.2%) on 2023.
  • The final ODA:GNI [gross national income] ratio was 0.50% (ie the UK spent 0.50% of its GNI on ODA), compared with 0.58% in 2023.
  • The largest amount of bilateral ODA was focused on the sectors ‘Refugees in donor countries’ (£2,827mn), ‘Humanitarian aid’ (£1,453mn) and ‘Unallocated/unspecified’ (£1,342mn).
  • Africa remained the largest recipient of UK region-specific bilateral ODA—accounting for 49.4% (up from 46.4% in 2023). In volume terms, ODA to Africa increased by £652mn (52.9%) to £1,885mn.
  • The top three recipients of UK country-specific bilateral ODA were Ukraine (£270mn), Afghanistan (£192mn) and Ethiopia (£182mn).[29]

The release noted the government adheres to the OECD Development Assistance Committee’s clarifications for defining what in-donor refugee costs can be considered ODA in statistical reporting.[30] These recognise that “refugee protection is a legal obligation and that assistance to refugees may be considered a form of humanitarian assistance”.

The Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) has noted that continued ‘in-donor’ spending on asylum support costs at current levels could mean the share of ODA for overseas development could in practice be 0.24% of GNI by 2027.[31] The ICAI is conducting a review of the UK’s management of its ODA spending target that it expects to complete in March 2026.[32]

Humanitarian charities criticised the government’s February 2025 announcement that ODA would be reduced as a share of GNI in the years ahead. For example, David Miliband, a former Labour foreign secretary now president and chief executive of the International Rescue Committee charity, said the decision was “a blow to Britain’s proud reputation as a global humanitarian and development leader”.[33]

Responding to the government’s decision in a letter published the following week, Sarah Champion, chair of the House of Commons International Development Committee, expressed her committee’s “deep concern” over the announcement.[34] She wrote:

Increased defence spending is undeniably needed and to be welcomed. However, our development spend protects not only the most vulnerable across the world but also the UK’s security, not least by helping to prevent conflict in the first place. Cutting ODA further to fund increased defence spending is a false economy that makes us less safe.

The commitment to allocate 0.7% of GNI to development assistance is enshrined in legislation. Although it has not been achieved since the reduction to 0.5% in 2021 by the previous government, this commitment has been a cornerstone of the UK’s international standing, supporting global efforts to address poverty, inequality and climate change. This brutal further cut to ODA risks undermining our soft power, as well as years of progress in areas such as healthcare, education, clean water and sustainable development. It will have dire consequences for millions of marginalised people across the world.[35]

In the House of Lords on 13 January 2026, members debated the humanitarian impacts of reductions in overseas aid. Baroness Chapman of Darlington, minister for international development, said the latest ODA budget priority allocation would be announced “very soon”.[36]

3. UK government approach to foreign policy

3.1 Previous Conservative government

In March 2023, the then Conservative government published its ‘Integrated review refresh’. This updated the UK’s approach to national security and international policy initially set out in the 2021 integrated review. It said the refresh was needed due to rapid geopolitical change since 2021, including increased global hostilities from countries such as China and Russia.

Along with commitments to increase investment in defence and national security, the integrated review refresh set out plans for investment in the UK’s economic security through partnerships and building the UK’s cooperation and trading relationship with countries in Europe, the Indo-Pacific, Africa, the Gulf and beyond; maximising soft power (for example through the BBC World Service and the British Council); further focus on developing a strategic advantage in science and technology; and leading on international development.[37]

Also in 2023, the then government published a new strategy for international development, building on the IR.[38] It said the UK approach was to be a “responsive development partner to countries’ needs”, which would involve “providing advice, exchanging lessons and evidence of what works, and building partnerships across government, business and civil society”.

3.2 Labour government

The Labour government has set out its foreign policy objectives under the principle of ‘reconnecting’ to the rest of the world. For example, Labour’s 2024 general election manifesto set out its ambition to “reconnect with allies and forge new partnerships to deliver security and prosperity at home and abroad”.[39] It argued that a “strong and connected Britain” was a necessary response to a “more volatile and insecure” world, exemplified by war having returned to Europe, violence in the Middle East, and geopolitical tensions exacerbated by rapid technological change and a changing climate. The manifesto said:

We will once again be a good partner for international development, and a defender of the international rule of law.[40]

The manifesto also pledged to strengthen diplomatic influence, including through the use of soft power via the UK’s creative and cultural institutions.[41]

It said the government would “rebuild” Britain’s international development reputation, including by restoring ODA spend to 0.7% of GNI when fiscal circumstances allowed and developing a “new approach based on genuine respect and partnership with the global south to support our common interests”.[42]

On 9 January 2025, the then foreign secretary, David Lammy, gave a speech on UK foreign policy.[43] Mr Lammy spoke about the importance of UK diplomats, economic growth and cooperation and soft power. In addition, he highlighted other strategic reviews the government had launched on:[44]

  • the UK’s global impact
  • how to maximise the benefits of the FCDO’s joint integrated development diplomacy model in development work
  • the UK’s economic capability in diplomacy

At the time of writing, the results of these reviews had not been published. However, further information on them can be found in the government’s press release: Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, ‘Foreign secretary launches expert reviews to strengthen UK’s global impact and expertise’ (9 September 2024).

Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office Seema Malhotra described the government’s partnership approach to international assistance in the House of Commons on 4 November 2025, in the context of the earlier decision to reduce spending:

We are moving from donor to investor, partnering with countries to unlock growth, jobs and trade through innovative finance and private sector investment. Secondly, we are moving from service delivery to system support, helping countries build their own education, health and economic systems, so that they can thrive without aid. Thirdly, we are moving from grants to expertise, leveraging UK strengths such as our world-class universities, the City of London, the Met Office, His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and the education, health and tech sectors. Fourthly, we are moving from international intervention to local leadership, working increasingly in partnership with local actors, rather than through internationally driven interventions.[45]

Ms Malhotra said “it is not all about how much we spend, but about how we spend”.[46]

Baroness Chapman has also written about these ‘four shifts’ in her chapter of the Fabian Society publication ‘Promising Development: The future of Aid in an Uncertain World’ (September 2025).

Responding to a written question on conflict prevention and peacebuilding in October 2025, the government described its approach:

We take a comprehensive and integrated approach to tackling conflict using all our diplomatic, development and security levers and working closely with our international partners. This approach recognises that addressing conflict effectively is not only about how much we spend. This enables us to prioritise our resources where they have most impact, and take the broader action needed to address the drivers of conflict, and effect lasting change.[47]

In December 2025, the government announced a new approach to working with African countries.[48] This included focusing on investment, trade, climate and technology, as well as cultural partnerships and conflict resolution.

4. Read more

Image by DFID on Flickr.

References

  1. Garrett Brown et al, ‘A Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics and International Relations’, 2018. Return to text
  2. Council on Foreign Relations, ‘What is soft power?’, 16 May 2023. Return to text
  3. International Monetary Fund, ‘Measuring soft power: A new global index’, October 2024. Return to text
  4. As above, pp 3 and 9. Return to text
  5. Brand Finance, ‘US sees steepest decline out of all 193 nation brands in global soft power index 2026’, 20 January 2026. Return to text
  6. Brand Finance, ‘Brand Finance global soft power index 2025: China overtakes UK for the first time, US remains top-ranked nation brand’, 20 February 2025. Return to text
  7. Brand Finance, ‘US sees steepest decline out of all 193 nation brands in global soft power index 2026’, 20 January 2026. Return to text
  8. British Council, ‘Global perceptions 2025’, November 2025, pp 5 and 43. Return to text
  9. Indian Strategic Studies Forum, ‘World soft power index 2023’, 2023. Return to text
  10. As above, p 8. Return to text
  11. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, ‘Foreign secretary launches UK Soft Power Council’, 17 January 2025. Return to text
  12. House of Commons, ‘Written question: Soft power (38157)’, 25 March 2025; and ‘Written question: Soft power (36814)’, 20 March 2025. Return to text
  13. House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, ‘Inquiry launch: Soft power—a strategy for UK success?’, 8 January 2025. Return to text
  14. As above. Return to text
  15. House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, ‘Oral evidence: Soft power—a strategy for UK success?’ 18 March 2025, HC 791 of session 2024–26, p 4. Return to text
  16. As above. Return to text
  17. House of Lords Soft Power and the UK’s Influence Committee, ‘Persuasion and power in the modern world’, 28 March 2014, HL Paper 150 of session 2013–14, p 6. Return to text
  18. As above, p 12. Return to text
  19. As above, p 73. Return to text
  20. As above, p 71. Return to text
  21. As above, p 75. Return to text
  22. HC Hansard, 26 November 2020, cols 1018–40. Return to text
  23. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, ‘Statistics on international development: Final UK ODA spend 2024’, updated 26 September 2025, p 5. Return to text
  24. HC Hansard, 25 February 2025, cols 631–57. See also: HL Hansard, 26 February 2025, cols 1756–69. Return to text
  25. Anneliese Dodds, ‘Personal X account’, 28 February 2025. Return to text
  26. House of Commons Library, ‘UK to reduce aid to 0.3% of gross national income from 2027’, 28 February 2025. Return to text
  27. House of Lords, ‘Written statement: 0.7% of GNI on ODA target 2024 (HLWS887)’, 22 July 2025. Return to text
  28. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, ‘Statistics on international development: Final UK ODA spend 2024’, updated 26 September 2025. See also: Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, ‘Statistics on international development’, updated 18 September 2025. Return to text
  29. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, ‘Statistics on international development: Final UK ODA spend 2024’, updated 26 September 2025, p 6. Return to text
  30. As above, p 36; and OECD, ‘In-donor refugee costs in official development assistance (ODA)’, 10 April 2024. Return to text
  31. Independent Commission on Aid Impact, ‘Watchdog warns UK refugee costs could absorb one-fifth of reduced aid budget’, 15 July 2025. Return to text
  32. Independent Commission on Aid Impact, ‘Management of the official development assistance spending target’, updated 15 July 2025. Return to text
  33. International Rescue Committee, ‘IRC responds to cuts to UK aid budget’, 25 February 2025. Return to text
  34. House of Commons International Development Committee, ‘Cross-party committee expresses “deep concern” at international aid cuts in letter to prime minister’, 5 March 2025. Return to text
  35. House of Commons International Development Committee, ‘Letter from Sarah Champion to Sir Keir Starmer’, 5 March 2025. Return to text
  36. HL Hansard, 13 January 2026, col 1675. Return to text
  37. HM Government, ‘Integrated review refresh 2023: Responding to a more contested and volatile world’, 13 March 2023, CP 811, pp 11–14. Return to text
  38. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, ‘The UK government’s strategy for international development’, 29 August 2023. Return to text
  39. Labour Party, ‘Labour Party manifesto 2024’, June 2024, pp 115–25. Return to text
  40. As above, p 117. Return to text
  41. As above, p 123. Return to text
  42. As above, p 125. Return to text
  43. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, ‘Locarno speech by the foreign secretary: January 2025’, 9 January 2025. Return to text
  44. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, ‘Foreign secretary launches expert reviews to strengthen UK’s global impact and expertise’, 9 September 2024. Return to text
  45. HC Hansard, 4 November 2025, cols 279–80WH. Return to text
  46. HC Hansard, 4 November 2025, cols 279–80WH. Return to text
  47. House of Commons, ‘Written question: Conflict prevention: Immigration (80942)’, 20 October 2025. Return to text
  48. House of Lords, ‘Written statement: The UK’s new approach to Africa (HLWS1168)’, 15 December 2025. Return to text