Ukraine update: October 2025

Approximate read time: 35 minutes

This briefing has been prepared ahead of a debate on the situation in Ukraine which will take place in the House of Lords on 31 October 2025.

1. Recent developments in Ukraine and Russia

1.1 Situation in Ukraine: October 2025

The conflict situation in Ukraine continues to evolve, not least as the nature of warfare in the country continues to change with the constant development and increasing use of drone and cyber capabilities (explored in section 3 of this briefing).

On the front lines in 2025, Russian forces have slowly expanded the amount of territory they control, mostly in the east of Ukraine.^[1] They have made gains in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions (also known as the Donbas), including in the area around the strategically important town of Pokrovsk and in the Kharkiv region. Russian forces are also reportedly taking fewer casualties, though they continue to suffer considerable losses of manpower and equipment, as they increase their use of drone technology.^[2]

However, at the time of writing, key strategic targets, including Pokrovsk, remain under Ukrainian control. This includes other targets in Ukraine’s so called ‘fortress belt’ running 50km (31 miles) through western Donetsk. The area contains several key cities and areas which have been heavily reinforced by Ukraine since the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) notes:

Ukraine has spent the last 11 years pouring time, money, and effort into reinforcing the fortress belt and establishing significant defence industrial and defensive infrastructure.^[3]

Some analysts claim that, despite Ukrainian setbacks, the decisive 2025 summer offensive that had been anticipated from Russian forces has not materialised. Writing for the Atlantic Council in early September 2025, Peter Dickinson argued:

The Kremlin’s ambitious plans to expand the war into northern Ukraine’s Sumy and Kharkiv regions have also fallen flat. During the initial weeks of the summer offensive in June, a swaggering Putin confidently declared that “all Ukraine is ours” and threatened to seize regional capital Sumy as part of efforts to establish a so-called “security buffer zone” stretching deep inside Ukraine. With the summer season now over, his invading troops find themselves pinned down in a handful of border villages, having been forced to retreat after a series of battlefield reverses.^[4]

Similarly, in its report on the progress of the war on 20 October 2025, the ISW said that Russia was “leaning into its cognitive warfare effort to portray Russian forces as relentlessly advancing and a Russian victory as inevitable”.^[5] However, the ISW said this effort “aims to obscure the reality that Russian forces are only making minimal gains at disproportionately high manpower costs” and that Russia is unlikely to obtain its strategic objectives by force in the short or medium term.

Away from the front lines, Russia continues to prosecute its air and missile campaign against Ukrainian infrastructure and cities. Throughout 2025 Ukraine has continued to come under almost daily missile and drone attacks from Russian forces, the volume of which reached record levels over the summer and autumn.^[6] This has been part of an evolution in Russian tactics in aerial bombardment over recent months involving the use of hundreds of drones at a time, combined with smaller numbers of ballistic missiles, which have proven increasingly effective.^[7] In the seven days between 5 and 12 October 2025, Russia reportedly launched more than 3,000 drones, 92 missiles and almost 1,400 glide bombs against Ukraine.

Emergency power outages have been brought in across almost all of Ukraine, and this will be the fourth consecutive winter of blackouts throughout Ukraine since February 2022.^[8] Russia is also targeting Ukrainian transport infrastructure such as the railways.^[9]

However, Ukraine has also evolved its approach to drone warfare (explored in further depth in section 3 of this briefing) and has scored several notable successes as it has attacked targets within Russia. As well as the ‘spiderweb’ raid which saw Ukraine destroy aircraft and targets at several Russian airbases,^[10] Ukrainian bombing raids on Russian oil refineries have gained significant momentum. Russia has not disclosed the impact of these attacks, but independent analysis suggests by late August 2025 Ukraine could have succeeded in disrupting between 17 to 20% of Russia’s oil refining capacity.^[11] The attacks have reportedly led to a spike in petrol prices inside Russia, and Crimea is among areas that have been hit by fuel shortages and rationing as Russia has lost refining capacity.^[12] Analyst David Kirichenko notes that Ukraine has been able to use Russia’s significant geographical size against it, “exploit[ing] the Kremlin’s inability to defend every inch of the endless Russian skies”.^[13]

1.2 Other developments in brief

There have been reported incursions into the airspace of several NATO member states in recent months. On 19 September 2025, three armed Russian MiG-31 aircrafts violated Estonian airspace for over 10 minutes.^[14] According to NATO officials this was part of a pattern of “increasingly irresponsible Russian behaviour”:

On 10 September, the council [NATO’s principal political decision-making body] held consultations in response to the large-scale violation of Polish airspace by Russian drones. Several other allies—including Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Romania—have also recently experienced airspace violations by Russia. […] Russia bears full responsibility for these actions, which are escalatory, risk miscalculation and endanger lives. They must stop.^[15]

These incursions have provoked a further debate around NATO’s air defences, as examined in section 3 of this briefing.

2025 has also seen several allegations of Russian interference in key European elections. In the September 2025 Moldovan presidential elections Russia was alleged to have engaged in a widespread disinformation campaign and vote-buying (allegations it denies).^[16] Similar allegations have been made regarding recent run-off presidential elections in Romania, after the original result in November 2024 was annulled by Romania’s Constitutional Court citing evidence provided by intelligence agencies that the electoral process had been “compromised throughout its duration and across all stages”.^[17] The incidents have prompted warnings against “algorithm-driven social media manipulation” and NATO member state national security vulnerabilities in the digital age.^[18]

Other issues of note include:

• Joint Russian-Belarusian military exercise. In September 2025 Russia and Belarus conducted large scale military exercises known as Zapad 2025.^[19] Some observers have argued these exercises are a preparation for direct conflict with NATO whilst others maintain they are in some respects scaled-down versions of previous exercises and do not constitute an imminent threat.^[20]
• NATO manoeuvres. NATO has conducted military manoeuvres of its own, notably ‘Eastern Sentry’ aimed to “bolster NATO’s posture along its eastern flank” following Russian incursions into NATO airspace.^[21] UK Defence Secretary John Healey has recently confirmed the extension of the Royal Air Force’s contribution to NATO’s Eastern Sentry mission to the end of 2025.^[22]
• Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports that Russia and Ukraine have agreed a special ceasefire zone to allow repairs to be made to damaged power lines leading to Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, which lost its connection to the grid on 23 September 2025 for the tenth time since the full scale conflict began.^[23]
• North Korean troops. North Korean troops continue to be active in Ukraine, including in several front-line clashes with Ukrainian forces and reportedly in ways that will allow North Korean forces to take battlefield lessons learned back to North Korea.^[24]

2. International response and diplomatic efforts in 2025

2025 has seen further developments in an attempt to negotiate a solution to the conflict in Ukraine, notably in bilateral meetings between US President Donald Trump and the Russian President Vladimir Putin, and between President Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and several other European leaders.

2.1 Talks in August 2025 and recent developments

In August 2025, President Trump and President Putin met in Alaska to discuss several issues including a potential resolution of the Ukraine conflict.^[25] It marked the first time that the two leaders had met in person to discuss Ukraine. Several topics were reportedly discussed in the meeting, including a potential ceasefire following on from earlier efforts by the White House to secure one in March 2025.^[26] However, nothing was publicly agreed on either a cessation of the war or on several issues crucial to both sides, including the status of Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory or security guarantees for Ukraine.

That summit was followed by a series of meetings in Washington between President Trump, President Zelenskyy and several European leaders. The meeting between presidents Trump and Zelenskyy was warmer than the previous meeting in the White House in February 2025, and President Trump reportedly told President Zelenskyy the US would help guarantee Ukraine’s security in any deal to end the war.^[27] During the subsequent multilateral meeting with EU leaders including Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer, President Trump stated:

I’m optimistic that collectively we can reach [a security] agreement that would deter any future aggression against Ukraine […] the European nations are going to take a lot of the burden, we’re going to help them and we’re going to make it very secure.^[28]

However, President Trump did not specify the extent of any such assistance and no formal announcements emerged from the talks. As explored in section 2.2.2 below, the ‘coalition of the willing’ led by the UK and France has committed to participating in a so-called “reassurance force” to help guarantee Ukraine’s security following the end of hostilities.^[29] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has said that any deployment of foreign troops in Ukraine after a settlement would amount to “foreign intervention” which would be unacceptable to Russia.^[30]

President Trump has said several times that he wishes to see direct negotiations between presidents Putin and Zelenskyy.^[31] President Zelenskyy has said he is willing to meet President Putin, though analysts suggest this could be a way to prove his argument that Russia is not serious about pursuing peace.^[32] The Russian administration has repeatedly ruled out such a meeting, with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov saying such a meeting could only take place once an agenda had been agreed.^[33]

Further developments have taken place in October 2025. Following a phone call between President Trump and President Putin on 17 October 2025, President Trump said that he had agreed to meet the Russian president in person in Hungary at a date to be determined.^[34] On the following day, President Zelenskyy met with President Trump in the White House. As well as the ongoing negotiations, the prelude to the meeting had focused on whether the US would be willing to provide Ukraine with cruise missiles to aid its long-range strike capabilities. In what was described as a “frank” meeting, no guarantees on cruise missiles were forthcoming.^[35] However, according to the ISW, the meeting ended with President Trump supporting a ceasefire on the current front lines and not President Putin’s demands that Ukraine cede territory in Donetsk Oblast.^[36] In comments issued after the meeting, Russia reiterated that it remained committed to addressing the alleged “root causes” of the war and is unwilling to agree to a ceasefire.^[37]

Also speaking after the meeting, President Zelenskyy said that he would be willing to join the Hungary talks if he was invited, adding:

If it is an invitation in a format where we meet as three or, as it’s called, shuttle diplomacy […] then in one format or another, we will agree.^[38]

However, Russia’s refusal to consider a ceasefire along the current battle lines appears to be prominent among several points of disagreement that have led to a subsequent postponement of the Hungary talks.^[39] Following a conversation between US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, on 21 October 2025, the White House said there were “no plans” for a Trump-Putin meeting “in the immediate future”. In subsequent remarks to reporters alongside NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, President Trump indicated that there remained significant differences between the US and Russian negotiating positions:

We cancelled the meeting with President Putin. It didn’t feel right to me. It didn’t feel like we were going to get to the place we have to get so I cancelled it. But we’ll do it in the future.^[40]

This was underlined on 22 October 2025, when the US announced new sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil, Russia’s two largest oil companies (following on from UK and European sanctions, as discussed in section 2.3 below). US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent linked the sanctions directly to “President Putin’s refusal to end this senseless war”:

Now is the time to stop the killing and for an immediate ceasefire. Given President Putin’s refusal to end this senseless war, Treasury is sanctioning Russia’s two largest oil companies that fund the Kremlin’s war machine. Treasury is prepared to take further action if necessary to support President Trump’s effort to end yet another war. We encourage our allies to join us in and adhere to these sanctions.^[41]

The background to the talks, covering the negotiating positions of both sides including Russia’s so-called ‘maximalist’ demands, is explored in the following briefing:

• House of Commons Library, ‘Peace in Ukraine: What have the August 2025 talks achieved?’, 20 August 2025

2.2 Military support and aid for Ukraine

2.2.1 Changing nature of US support for Ukraine

Under President Trump, the US approach to supplying military assistance to Ukraine has changed as the Trump administration has apparently prioritised a negotiated settlement. As such, President Trump has not sought congressional approval for any new funding for US military assistance to Ukraine, although the US has largely continued to deliver aid committed by the Biden administration.^[42] The US has also stepped back from leading the Ukraine Defence Contact Group (UDCG)—the alliance of 57 countries and the European Union supporting the defence of Ukraine—which has been coordinating military assistance to Kyiv since the onset of the conflict.

Since that time, mixed messages have continued to emerge from the US administration on military support for Ukraine. At the beginning of July 2025, the US administration confirmed that some military aid to Ukraine was being suspended while the Department of Defense (now the recently renamed US Department of War) conducted a capability review.^[43] However, under the direction of President Trump, the Department for Defense appeared to reverse this decision only a few days later and the supply of weapons resumed.^[44]

On 14 July 2025, the US administration also announced a new package of military assistance to Ukraine.^[45] However, President Trump said that the US will not pay for any of this new assistance. Instead, it will be funded by NATO allies via NATO’s newly created ‘Prioritized Ukraine requirements list’ (PURL) initiative, and some assets including Patriot air defence systems will be delivered to backfill European capabilities that will be sent to Ukraine in the first instance. Speaking alongside President Trump in the White House, the NATO secretary general, Mark Rutte, said that it was “totally logical” and right for Europe to “step up” and fund US assistance. The US Congressional Research Service also notes that, between May and August 2025, the US announced approval of an estimated $2.32bn in foreign military sales (FMS) to Ukraine.^[46] Yet as examined in further detail in the section 2.2.2 below, despite the launch of the PURL initiative and increased aid from European partners, recent months have reportedly seen a sharp decrease in overall military aid supplied to Ukraine.^[47]

2.2.2 Support for Ukraine from the UK and other European nations/NATO members

The UK and other European nations (with the exception of Hungary) have continued to pledge support for Ukraine throughout 2025, as well as committing to raising defence spending and committing to further European rearmament. NATO heads of state and government and key partners met at the Hague in the Netherlands on 24 to 25 June 2025, where alliance members including the UK committed to raising defence spending as a percentage of GDP to 5% by 2035.^[48] The Hague summit declaration stated:

United in the face of profound security threats and challenges, in particular the long-term threat posed by Russia to Euro-Atlantic security and the persistent threat of terrorism, allies commit to invest 5% of GDP annually on core defence requirements as well as defence-and security-related spending by 2035 to ensure our individual and collective obligations, in accordance with article 3 of the Washington Treaty. Our investments will ensure we have the forces, capabilities, resources, infrastructure, warfighting readiness, and resilience needed to deter and defend in line with our three core tasks of deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security.^[49]

In 2025, the UK and Germany assumed leadership of the UDCG. On 9 September 2025, the UK defence secretary, John Healey, hosted NATO’s secretary general, Mark Rutte, along with Ukraine’s minister of defence, Denys Shmyhal, and Germany’s minister of defence, Boris Pistorius, for the 30th meeting of the UDCG.^[50] Ahead of that meeting, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) reported that “more than £2bn” of military support for Ukraine had now been secured through the UK-led International Fund for Ukraine (IFU) for priority military equipment to support the most urgent requirements of Ukraine’s armed forces.^[51]

The UK and France are also leading a ‘coalition of the willing’ of 35 countries to support any potential peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia.^[52] In a statement on 5 September 2025, French President Emmanuel Macron said that 26 of those countries had committed to deploying troops in Ukraine—or to maintaining a presence on land, at sea, or in the air—to help guarantee the country’s security the day after a ceasefire or peace is achieved.^[53] However, both President Macron and Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer have previously said any European “reassurance” force in Ukraine will need the backing of the United States.

According to data from the MOD published on 12 September 2025, the UK has now committed £21.8bn in support of Ukraine.^[54] This equates to £13bn in military assistance, £5.3bn in non-military assistance, and £3.5bn in cover limit provided by UK Export Finance for reconstruction projects in Ukraine. The £5.3bn in non-military assistance includes £4.1bn in fiscal support, and over £1.2bn in bilateral assistance. As part of this aid, the UK has said it will allocate up to £283mn of bilateral assistance to Ukraine for financial year 2025/26. The government states that this funding will support humanitarian, energy, stabilisation, reform, recovery and reconstruction programmes.

On military aid, the UK government has made several commitments during the course of 2025 including investing £350mn this year to increase the supply of drones to Ukraine from a target of 10,000 in 2024 to 100,000 in 2025.^[55] The UK is also to provide 350 ASRAAM air defence missiles using £70mn of funding, to be repaid using revenues from sanctioned Russian assets.^[56] In his update to Parliament on Ukraine before the summer recess on 17 July 2025, the defence secretary said on the scale of the UK’s commitment:

First, on the extraordinary revenue acceleration scheme, two-thirds of the UK’s ERA total of £2.26bn commitment has now been disbursed, including £700mn on artillery shells, long-range rockets, and air defence missiles, exactly what Ukraine needs most.

Second, on drones. Since March, the UK has supplied nearly 50,000 drones to Ukraine helping meet our commitment to increase tenfold our supply this year.

Third, on air defence, the UK and Germany have agreed to partner in providing critical air defence missiles to Ukraine.

And fourth, on the NATO comprehensive assistance package, the UK will donate a further £40mn, which Ukraine can use on a range of programmes from demining to rehabilitating their wounded.^[57]

Further to this, on 5 September 2025 the MOD said it had supplied 5mn rounds of ammunition, 60,000 artillery shells, rockets and missiles, and around 2,500 drones and air defence to Ukraine in the previous 50 days.^[58] The UK has also continued several other initiatives including Operation Interflex to train Ukrainian personnel, and measures designed to support the Ukrainian energy sector.

In an update on 5 October 2025, the government said that more than 85,000 military drones have been delivered by the UK to Ukraine in six months of 2025 and that it had upped its spending on drones to £600mn.^[59]

However, despite the provision of bilateral assistance and the launch of NATO’s PURL initiative, tracking of military aid to Ukraine by the Kiel Institute reportedly showed that, whilst financial and humanitarian aid remained stable, military aid to Ukraine saw a sharp decline of 43% in July and August 2025 compared to earlier 2025 levels.^[60] The Kiel Institute reported:

Although the new [PURL] mechanism was launched, military aid declined significantly in July and August. After the US stopped announcing new aid packages at the beginning of 2025, European countries stepped in and significantly expanded their military support. As a result, the monthly average of military aid allocations in the first half of 2025 exceeded those of 2022–2024—despite the lack of US contributions. However, this momentum collapsed in the summer: military allocations from European countries fell by 57 percent compared to January–June 2025, even when their contributions to the NATO PURL initiative were included. The reduction in military support from Europe was, however, partly offset by higher allocations from other countries. Most notably, Canada announced EUR 1.2bn in military aid in August, part of which was channelled through NATO’s PURL mechanism. If we count total aid—including by European donors and others—the monthly aid decline was 43%.^[61]

Analysis from the House of Commons Library has noted that greater emphasis is being given to initiatives aimed at the joint production of capabilities between Ukraine’s defence industry and the UK/European defence industrial base.^[62] This is exemplified in the deal signed by the UK and Ukraine for 5,000 air defence missiles from UK firm Thales in July 2025,^[63] and demonstrated in the commitment between the UK and Ukraine to share battlefield technology advances, as discussed in section 3 of this briefing.

On 24 October 2025, Sir Keir hosted President Zelenskyy and members of the coalition of the willing in London.^[64] In a communique issued following the summit, as well as reiterating the need to keep up the economic pressure on Russia and tackle issues such as its shadow fleet, leaders pledged further support over the coming year:

[The leaders] also expressed their intent to address Ukraine’s pressing financial needs for 2026–2027 including working up options to use the full value of immobilised Russian sovereign assets, so that Ukraine has the resources it needs to defend its territory and rebuild its armed forces. They were clear that this should be in addition to existing flows of bilateral military aid, which would not diminish.^[65]

2.3 Latest sanctions picture and threat of additional tariffs on Russia

The UK, US, Europe and other partner nations continue to levy extensive sanctions on Russia. Despite fears of a divergence from its European allies, the Trump administration has not removed, or relaxed, any of the sanctions against Russia for its actions in Ukraine that were imposed under previous administrations. Indeed, President Trump has threatened to levy additional sanctions and “secondary” tariffs on Russia and Russian goods should a resolution to the conflict not be found.^[66]

The UK has now imposed sanctions against over 2,800 Russian individuals, entities and ships (more than 2,600 since the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022).^[67] This includes 450 ‘shadow fleet’ vessels for transporting Russian energy in violation of the oil price cap, which was introduced in December 2022, and which prohibits G7 companies from shipping, insuring, or otherwise servicing Russian oil sold above the price cap. Initially the cap was set at $60 per barrel but in July 2025 the UK and the EU announced this would be lowered to $47.60, further impacting Russia’s oil revenues which the UK government claims “have already fallen 35% year-on-year to May”.^[68] The UK government also claims that UK, US and EU sanctions have denied Russia access to at least $450bn since February 2022, which it argues is equivalent to around two years of funding for the invasion.^[69] It also maintains that Russia pays up to six times more for dual-use items (equipment with military and non-military applications), and that the cost to Russia of defence sector components rose 30% over three years compared to global prices.

Among the sanctions announced by the UK in 2025 are those specifically targeting those involved in “forcibly deporting, indoctrinating [and] militarising Ukrainian children”.^[70] The UK has also financed the purchase of military equipment for Ukraine using the proceeds from frozen Russian assets.^[71] Debate over the seizure of Russian state-owned assets within the UK and Europe is also ongoing, with Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer describing the issue as “complicated” and the subject of ongoing conversations with partner and allied countries.^[72] On 20 October 2025, the Guardian reported that European leaders, including in the UK, were “increasingly confident” that a proposal to lend Ukraine €140bn (£122bn) secured on frozen Russian central bank deposits could be agreed by the end of the year.^[73]

On 15 October 2025, the UK government also announced 90 new sanctions directly targeting Rosneft and Lukoil, two of the world’s biggest energy companies which together export 3.1mn barrels of oil per day.^[74] Rosneft is reportedly responsible for 6% of global, and nearly half of all Russian, oil production. The sanctions package also targeted four oil terminals in China, 44 tankers in the ‘shadow fleet’ transporting Russian oil, and Nayara Energy Limited, which imported 100mn barrels of Russian crude worth over $5bn in 2024.^[75] The EU has sanctioned Rosneft but not Lukoil, which is privately owned, in part due to exemptions for Hungary and Slovakia which buy Russian oil.^[76]

This move was followed on 22 October 2025 by the US also announcing new sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil. Commenting on the move, Edward Fishman, a former senior State Department sanctions official, said that Rosneft was the most important Russian firm not yet under full US sanctions. He added:

I expect, at the very least, some pullback from dealings with Russian oil in the short term. Whether this marks a long-term, strategic squeeze on Russia’s oil revenues—the lifeblood of Putin’s economy—will depend on the US commitment to active, ongoing enforcement.^[77]

The UK, US and allied countries remain concerned that the economic impact of the sanctions regime is being weakened by other countries—particularly China and India—continuing to buy Russian goods and oil in particular. On 6 August 2025, President Trump issued an executive order entitled ‘Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of the Russian Federation’, which established a 25% tariff on imports from India for “currently directly or indirectly importing Russian Federation oil”.^[78] This tariff was imposed on top of an existing 25%—taking the total tariff to 50%—which the Trump administration has characterised as punishment against Delhi for buying Russian oil and weapons.^[79] Subsequently, on 15 October 2025, President Trump said that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi had reportedly agreed to stop purchases of Russian oil “within a short period of time”.^[80] President Trump added “now I’ve got to get China to do the same thing”. In response, a Chinese government spokesperson said it had “normal, legitimate economic, trade, and energy co-operation with countries around the world, including Russia”.

The US has also called on the EU and the other G7 countries to impose tariffs of 50% to 100% on China and India for their purchase of Russian oil.^[81] On 13 September 2025, President Trump announced on his social media platform Truth Social that the US was “ready to do major sanctions on Russia” but only when NATO member states stop buying oil from Russia.^[82]

Speaking to an energy forum in Moscow in October 2025, President Putin said the country was still one of the world’s largest oil producers despite facing “unfair” measures, adding: “Russia maintains its position as one of the leading oil producers, despite the use of unfair competition mechanisms against us”.^[83]

3. Evolving nature of warfare in Ukraine

The conflict in Ukraine continues to evolve rapidly. Both sides in the conflict continue to change their tactics and make increasing use of innovative technologies and weapon systems being developed at rapid speed. The result has seen Ukraine labelled as a “real-time lab for global innovation” in military technologies.^[84]

Ukraine is a world leader in drone design and execution, with drone technology evolving on average every six weeks.^[85] According to the UK Ministry of Defence, in Ukraine “drones now kill more people than traditional artillery”.^[86] As noted in section 1 above, Ukraine has been able to carry out sophisticated drone attacks within Russia to target key strategic targets such as Russia’s air force and energy sites. American intelligence sharing with Ukraine has reportedly been crucial in increasing the efficacy of these long-range drone strikes, enabling Ukraine to better prepare drone routes to evade Russian air defences.^[87] Yet Ukraine’s evolving usage of drone technology also goes beyond these operations, as Vitaliy Nabukhotny outlines for the Atlantic Council:

Over the past three years, first person view (FPV) drones have become a ubiquitous feature of the contemporary battlefield and are believed to be responsible for the vast majority of Russian and Ukrainian casualties. This is changing the way the war is fought. Any vehicles operating close to the front lines must now rely on jamming devices, with many also favouring the additional protection of so-called “cope cage” coverings to shield against drone attacks. With larger groups of infantry deemed too vulnerable to drone strikes, attacks are typically carried out by small groups, often using highly mobile transport such as motorbikes or buggies.

Ukraine has also pioneered the use of drones and accompanying software to perform surveillance tasks mapping out the battlefield and providing real-time situational awareness of enemy deployments. This reconnaissance capability is not new in itself, but has undergone significant upgrades in recent years. Accurate and up-to-date information allows commanders to make informed decisions quickly, improving the effectiveness of military operations.

Beyond the battlefield, Ukraine has also transformed international understanding of drone warfare at sea. Since 2022, Ukrainian naval drones have succeeded in sinking or damaging around one-third of Russia’s entire Black Sea Fleet, forcing the remainder of Putin’s warships to retreat from Russian-occupied Crimea to the relative safety of Russia’s own Black Sea ports. Most recently, Ukraine claimed to have used naval drones to shoot down two Russian warplanes over the Black Sea.^[88]

Ukraine has also employed drones in logistical roles. The Ukrainian army uses both aerial and ground-based unmanned systems to deliver ammunition, food, medicine, and other supplies to troops operating in dangerous or inaccessible areas, thereby reducing the need to expose personnel to hostile environments.^[89] In addition, Ukraine has used drones to help take surrendering Russian soldiers prisoner.

Ukraine also continues to engage in a sophisticated cyber warfare programme against Russian targets. Some of this action is undertaken by official state actors but Ukraine is also making significant use (as is Russia) of non-state actors. These include privately contracted mercenary groups or activist groups loosely affiliated with the state including ‘Ukraine’s IT Army’, a volunteer cyber force which has conducted attacks on Russian digital infrastructure.^[90] Writing for Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), Dr Joana de Deus Pereira notes that this presents a complex web of action and accountability on both sides of the conflict:

Some actors operate as state-aligned proxies, others are ideologically motivated or simply commercially driven. Yet most operate outside formal military command chains, making lines of responsibility blurry. Many of these operations take place under, or with the tacit approval of, state contracts or sponsorship, while others act with greater autonomy, a spectrum that complicates efforts to assign accountability.

Ukraine’s digital battlespace has been particularly shaped by distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, phishing campaigns, malware deployment and information operations, many attributed to Russian-aligned groups like Killnet, NoName057(16), and Sandworm, which operate in coordination with, but often outside, formal state infrastructures. On the defensive front, Ukraine’s IT Army […] has also conducted attacks on Russian digital infrastructure, raising questions about legal status, accountability, and escalation thresholds.^[91]

Russia’s approach and use of technology has also evolved significantly since the start of the war. In addition to the cyber warfare tactics such as DDoS attacks, Russia has adapted its aerial tactics after the poor performance of its air force early in the war to include mass bombardments of the kind detailed above in section 1. On the front lines in the east, Russia has also significantly increased the use of glide bombs to target Ukrainian positions and made several tactical changes including flying drones at higher altitudes, and faster, making them increasingly difficult to target with air defence measures. The deployment of new technologies, such as kamikaze Shahed drones originally supplied by Iran and now being mass produced in Russia, have helped spearhead these advances.^[92] These drones, and similar advances in drone technologies reportedly supplied by China, have enabled Russia to negate or reduce the effectiveness of defensive technologies that rely on electronic warfare (EW) to hamper drone activity.^[93] Russian forces have also reportedly improved their precise strike capabilities by equipping medium-range reconnaissance and strike drones with artificial intelligence and machine learning capabilities and longer-lasting charges, and have been making use of fibre-optic drones to target the rear of Ukrainian positions. The Institute for the Study of War has noted that the usage of these technologies has seen Russia gain advantages largely not seen in the previous three years of the war due to the density and sophistication of air defences.^[94] On 26 October 2025, Russia also claimed that it had successfully tested its nuclear-powered Burevestnik cruise missile, a nuclear-capable weapon Moscow says “can pierce any defence shield”.^[95]

Russia’s use of drones, including those which have reportedly violated Polish and Romanian airspace, has increased the focus on air defence systems both in Ukraine and across NATO. The Institute for the Study of War has said that Ukraine and its partners “must invest urgently” in kinetic anti-drone systems that are not reliant on EW.^[96] The issue of air defences was a focus of a meeting of NATO defence ministers in Brussels on 15 October 2025. At the meeting, NATO officials said that “building on recent incidents”, the ministers agreed to implement additional counter-drone measures to expand NATO’s capabilities.^[97] This included testing integrated counter-drone systems under Eastern Sentry, as well as fostering cooperation with the EU and private sector for rapid innovation.

Ukraine has sought to encourage international involvement and the deployment of innovative technologies through its ‘Test in Ukraine’ programme, a defence technology testing platform that allows international companies to evaluate their military solutions under real-world combat conditions.^[98] The programme is designed to streamline access for foreign developers of advanced defence systems, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), naval drones, electronic warfare solutions, and AI-driven technologies. Through structured field testing and direct feedback from Ukrainian military personnel, Ukrainian sources argue that companies can “optimize their technologies for deployment in high-intensity environments”. Dr Joana de Deus Pereira argues that the effects of Ukraine’s potential as a marketplace and testbed for these technologies is already having a marked impact:

Building on Ukraine’s role as both a geostrategic flashpoint and marketplace, a wider wave of actors—particularly veteran-founded start-ups and other investors across Europe—has converged at speed, driving an investment surge of 500% to $5.2bn in 2024, with more than 80 start-ups now active.^[99]

She notes that behind the military hardware sits what is arguably the most decisive asset, data, arguing that “Ukraine now treats wartime telemetry as strategic capital, considered the most valuable digital battlefield trove that shapes their negotiations with Western allies”.

The UK is seeking to both aid Ukraine in grappling with these rapid advances and to benefit from them. The UK has signed an agreement with Ukraine to share battlefield technology.^[100] Under the terms of the deal, technology data sets from Ukraine’s front line are set to be plugged into UK production lines, “allowing British defence firms to rapidly design and build, at scale, cutting edge military equipment available nowhere else in the world”. The UK government has also invested £600mn to accelerate drone delivery for Ukraine’s armed forces, including tens of thousands of short-range FPV drones.^[101] The UK and Ukraine have also announced plans to jointly develop an inceptor drone, further developing technology already in use in Ukraine to protect civilians and critical infrastructure from Russian drones.

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Cover image by Max Kukurudziak on Unsplash