Ukraine update: September 2023

On 21 September 2023, the House of Lords will debate the following:

Baroness Goldie (Conservative) to move that this House takes note of the situation in Ukraine.

Baroness Goldie has served as a minister of state at the Ministry of Defence since July 2019.

The last House of Lords Library update on Ukraine was published in February 2023. This note updates that briefing and examines key developments over recent months.

1. Current state of the conflict: Progress of the Ukrainian counteroffensive

The latest stage of the ongoing war in Ukraine has been largely defined by the progress of the much-anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive against occupying Russian forces, launched in June 2023.

Since June, Ukraine has committed significant resources, in terms of both personnel and sophisticated weapon systems provided by allied countries such as the UK, to attacking Russian forces in the south and east of the country. However, Ukrainian officials acknowledged from the outset that this would be a very different operation than the rapid counterattack in late 2022 which saw Ukrainian forces quickly retake territory around the towns of Kherson and Kupiansk. Since then, while the conflict has continued particularly around the contested city of Bakhmut, Russian forces have had months in which to fortify and barricade their positions, digging anti-tank trenches and laying large numbers of mines.

The areas of Russian control in the south of Ukraine are illustrated in the map from BBC News below. Of particular strategic importance is the so-called ‘land bridge’ between Crimea in the south and occupied cities such as Mariupol and Donetsk in the east. The connection is a key supply line for Russian forces and logistics.

Figure 1: Map of Ukraine showing areas of Russian military control

The success or otherwise of the offensive to date has been the subject of considerable debate. Since June, Ukrainian territorial gains have been relatively minor. In August, unnamed American security officials were quoted in prominent news outlets such as the New York Times criticising the pace of the Ukrainian advance, arguing that resources had been misallocated and tactically misused. They also argued that time was running out for Ukraine to make significant military gains before rainy conditions force a pause in the counteroffensive. This prompted an angry response from Kyiv, particularly from Ukraine’s foreign minister, Dmytro Kuleba.

However, in early September 2023 there have been reports of significant progress, particularly in the Zaporizhzhia area. Ukrainian Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavski claimed that Ukrainian forces had “decisively breached” Russia’s first defensive line near Zaporizhzhia after weeks of painstaking mine clearance. He contended that there was also an expectation of faster gains as Ukrainian forces press a weaker second line. In a sign that such moves were putting pressure on Russian forces, Moscow reportedly moved some of its elite troops to reinforce existing forces. This could be particularly significant given a reported lack of Russian operational and strategic reserves. According to Ukrainian officials, a key longer-term objective remains driving towards the Sea of Azov, therefore potentially severing the land bridge supply route between Russian forces.

At the time of writing, the veracity of such claims of progress remains unclear, as does the significance of such moves and whether any territorial gains can be consolidated or will lead to further breakthroughs.

As explored in section 5 below on the future of the conflict, the success or otherwise of the current counteroffensive is likely to be highly significant in how the war progresses and/or any potential ceasefire terms.

2. International diplomatic and military assistance to Ukraine

2.1 Support from the UK for Ukraine

The UK has been a prominent supporter of Ukraine since the start of the invasion. This support was reiterated earlier this year when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy visited the UK in February 2023 to meet with Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, address Parliament, meet the King and visit Ukrainian troops. President Zelenskyy also met with Rishi Sunak at Chequers in May 2023 ahead of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, where the UK confirmed that it had provided long-range Storm Shadow precision cruise missiles to Ukraine. At the same meeting, the prime minister confirmed the further UK provision of hundreds of air defence missiles and unmanned aerial systems including hundreds of new long-range attack drones with a range of over 200km.

Speaking at that meeting, Rishi Sunak said:

This is a crucial moment in Ukraine’s resistance to a terrible war of aggression they did not choose or provoke. They need the sustained support of the international community to defend against the barrage of unrelenting and indiscriminate attacks that have been their daily reality for over a year.

We must not let them down. The frontlines of Putin’s war of aggression may be in Ukraine but the fault lines stretch all over the world. It is in all our interest to ensure Ukraine succeeds and Putin’s barbarism is not rewarded.

That is why the UK is sustaining our support to Ukraine—from tanks to training, ammunition to armoured vehicles. And this message of solidarity will ring loud in all my meetings with fellow world leaders in the days ahead.

The UK is the second-largest donor of military support to Ukraine, after the US. It has provided £4.6bn in military assistance to Ukraine so far—£2.3bn in 2022 and a commitment to match that funding in 2023. Through Operation Interflex, the UK is also hosting a training programme which is supported by several allies, with the aim of training 30,000 new and existing Ukrainian personnel by the end of 2023. The UK has committed to training Ukrainian fast jet pilots and marines, but has said that combat fighter aircraft will not be provided, at least in the short term. The UK has also supplied 14 Challenger 2 tanks to Ukraine alongside spare parts.

Between 21 and 22 June 2023, the Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC) took place in London, co-hosted by the UK and Ukraine. The conference was a continuation of a cycle of annual events, with URC 2022 conducted jointly between Ukraine and Switzerland in Lugano.

URC 2022, held for the first time during the ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine, launched the Lugano Principles, which laid the foundation for the reconstruction process in Ukraine. Ukraine has already undertaken initiatives to move forward with reconstruction in line with these principles and commitments, despite the circumstances of war.

Since the Lugano conference, the international community has pledged significant emergency assistance. However, the organisers of the London conference argued that a broader mobilisation of public and private sectors is needed to meet the scale of Ukraine’s stabilisation and recovery needs following Russian attacks.

At the London conference, the prime minister set out a “major package of financial support for Ukraine”. This included $3bn of World Bank loan guarantees to bolster Ukraine’s economic stability as it continues to push back Russian forces and a further £240mn of bilateral assistance. He said that this funding would support vital public services, including the cost of running schools and hospitals.

The UK government said this was the first bilateral package of multi-year fiscal assistance to be set out by a G7 country, “underlining the UK’s unwavering commitment to the country, both now and in the future”. Ministers said this brought the UK’s non-military assistance to Ukraine to more than £4.7bn, including £4.1bn of fiscal support and £640mn of bilateral assistance.

Foreign Secretary James Cleverly also announced further measures at the London URC which included funding for urgent repairs and early recovery, support for Ukraine’s energy sector, and programmes to bolster wider rebuilding efforts. As part of the conference, the UK also called on the private sector to boost Ukraine’s recovery and support both urgent recovery needs and long-term reconstruction.

The specifics of the announcement included:

• A £45mn envelope of funding, part of the UK’s wider £62mn programme, to support Ukraine’s energy recovery over the next two years. Of this, £25mn is going to the International Finance Corporation’s Ukraine economic resilience action platform, to bolster Ukraine’s energy security. £3mn will support a new technical assistance facility to speed up Ukraine’s energy sector reform and decarbonisation.
• A £26.3mn equivalent loan backed by UK Export Finance, allowing the Ukrainian government to start rebuilding six vital bridges damaged as a direct result of the illegal Russian invasion, reopening supply routes near the capital, Kyiv.
• £12mn to the Partnership fund for a resilient Ukraine to enable the government of Ukraine and its communities to remain resilient in the face of Russia’s aggression, including support to identify and respond to immediate recovery priorities in newly liberated territories in the east, south and in Ukraine’s border areas.
• $25mn from the UK’s development finance institution, British International Investment (BII), to support the International Finance Corporation’s (IFC) global trade finance program to help keep cross-border trade lines open. This follows the prime minister’s announcement […] that the UK is committing £250mn of new capital to BII.
• A further £15mn for a new anti-corruption e-governance project, being delivered with UK support, to build transparency and accountability into key public services in Ukraine.
• £2mn to the government of Ukraine’s digital system for reconstruction management, the Digital Restoration Ecosystem for Accountable Management (DREAM) platform which will increase the transparency of reconstruction projects.

The announcement also included the signing of memorandums of understanding on helping to secure Ukraine’s green energy future and to provide support to Ukraine on building its tax service.

The UK is also maintaining its sanctions regime against Russia interests. According to recent data:

• 1,627 individuals and 238 entities are subject to UK sanctions under the Russia regime.
• The UK has targeted over 130 oligarchs with a net worth of over £145bn.

In tandem with international trade and financial restrictions, Russia is now the most sanctioned country in the world.

2.2 US

The US is the largest provider of military assistance to Ukraine, having committed $43.7bn since the start of the Biden administration. $43bn of that assistance has been provided since February 2022. The support provided to date includes powerful HIMARS satellite guided weapons systems and, more controversially, cluster munitions. (Many observers including Human Rights Watch have also noted extensive use of cluster bombs by Russian forces since the beginning of the war.) Most recently, on 7 September 2023 the US announced that it would supply Ukrainian forces with depleted uranium shells for their US-made M1 Abrams tanks, matching the commitment by the UK to supply similar weapons in March 2023. (A full list of the military equipment that the US has supplied to Ukraine is available in a Congressional Research Service briefing on the subject.)

In a statement released on 24 August 2023 to mark the anniversary of Ukraine’s independence, President Joe Biden said that America’s commitment to Ukraine was unwavering:

The United States will continue our work, together with partners all around the world, to support Ukraine’s ability to defend itself against Russia’s aggression, to uphold the foundational principles of the UN Charter, and to help the Ukrainian people build the secure, prosperous, and independent future they deserve.

Our commitment to Ukraine’s independence is unwavering and enduring. That’s why the United States and other G7 nations issued a joint declaration in Lithuania last month pledging to help Ukraine maintain armed forces capable of deterring Russian aggression in years to come, a declaration which over 25 nations have now joined. Together with our partners in Europe, we are supporting Ukraine in their fight for freedom now and we will help them over the long term.

We are also working with nations everywhere to hold Russian forces accountable for the war crimes and other atrocities they have committed in Ukraine. That includes the forcible removal of thousands of Ukrainian children to Russia. These children have been stolen from their parents and kept apart from their families. It’s unconscionable. And today, we are announcing new sanctions to hold those responsible for these forced transfers and deportations to account, and to demand that Ukrainian children be returned to their families.

The US Congressional Research Service notes that the US Congress has approved over $113bn in funding over the past two financial years:

In total, Congress has appropriated $113.4bn for supplemental funding for Ukraine in FY2022 and FY2023. Such funding has supported foreign assistance for Ukraine and other countries affected by the war, US-European Command operations and related support for the US military, and administration and operations of other US government agencies that have responded to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, including funding for legal enforcement, sanctions implementation, and Ukrainian refugee and entrant assistance.

2.3 EU

The European Union is also providing non-lethal and lethal arms through its European Peace Facility (EPF). This is the first time in its history that the EU has approved the supply of lethal weapons to a third country. To date, the EU has committed just over €5.6bn, including €1bn of funds to reimburse EPF countries who have provided urgently needed munitions. €1bn of EPF funds has also been set aside for the joint EU procurement of artillery ammunition. In October 2022, the EU also approved a new training mission for the Ukrainian armed forces. In addition, almost 1,800 individuals and entities are subject to EU sanctions against Russia.

Ukraine applied for EU membership in February 2022 and was granted EU candidate status in June 2022. On 22 June 2023, Olivér Várhelyi, the commissioner for enlargement, said Ukraine has completed two of the seven steps outlined by the bloc for Ukraine to be granted the status of a candidate for EU membership. These related to the composition of two high-level judicial bodies in Ukraine and the regulation of the media sector, where legislation was amended to align with EU standards. Mr Várhelyi also said that Ukraine had made “good progress” on a third requirement—the selection of judges for the Constitutional Court—and “some progress” on the remaining four: the fight against corruption, the prevention of money laundering, the mitigation of the excessive influence exerted by oligarchs, and the protection of national minorities.

2.4 NATO

While Ukraine is not a member of the NATO alliance (and is therefore not covered by the mutual defence provisions under article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty), NATO has been active in its political support of Ukraine and its support for the provision of bilateral military assistance by individual allies. NATO is helping to coordinate requests for assistance from the Ukrainian government and is supporting the delivery of humanitarian and non-lethal aid. At the NATO summit in Vilnius in July 2023, NATO reaffirmed its “unwavering solidarity with the government and people of Ukraine”.

With regard to Ukraine’s potential membership of NATO, the 2023 Vilnius summit communiqué said that “Ukraine’s future was in NATO”. It added that an invitation would be extended when allied members agreed, and membership conditions had been met:

We fully support Ukraine’s right to choose its own security arrangements. Ukraine’s future is in NATO. We reaffirm the commitment we made at the 2008 summit in Bucharest that Ukraine will become a member of NATO, and today we recognise that Ukraine’s path to full Euro-Atlantic integration has moved beyond the need for the membership action plan. Ukraine has become increasingly interoperable and politically integrated with the alliance, and has made substantial progress on its reform path. In line with the 1997 Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine and the 2009 complement, [NATO] allies will continue to support and review Ukraine’s progress on interoperability as well as additional democratic and security sector reforms that are required. NATO foreign ministers will regularly assess progress through the adapted Annual national programme. The alliance will support Ukraine in making these reforms on its path towards future membership. We will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the alliance when allies agree and conditions are met.

On 4 July 2023, Finland became the 31st member of NATO. In addition, Sweden looks set to follow soon now that Turkey has dropped its objections to Sweden’s membership.

2.5 G7

In May 2023, the leaders of the G7 nations, the UK, Italy, Canada, France, the US, Japan and Germany, met in Hiroshima in Japan, alongside the presidents of the European Commission and the European Council. In the communiqué released following the summit, the G7 also reiterated its support for Ukraine:

We once again condemn in the strongest possible terms the war of aggression by Russia against Ukraine, which constitutes a serious violation of international law, including the UN Charter. Russia’s brutal war of aggression represents a threat to the whole world in breach of fundamental norms, rules and principles of the international community. We reaffirm our unwavering support for Ukraine for as long as it takes to bring a comprehensive, just and lasting peace. We issued the G7 leaders’ statement on Ukraine, and with the clear intention and concrete actions set forth in it, we commit to intensifying our diplomatic, financial, humanitarian and military support for Ukraine, to increasing the costs to Russia and those supporting its war efforts, and to continuing to counter the negative impacts of the war on the rest of the world, particularly on the most vulnerable people.

3. Russia-China cooperation and other strategic moves by Russia

3.1 Current state of Russian-Chinese relations

Russia has increasingly sought to develop its political and military relationships with various strategic partners across the world, and this has only accelerated in response to Western support for Ukraine and the sanctions regime imposed upon its interests. For example, Russia is reportedly importing munitions from North Korea and drone technology from Iran.

However, arguably the most important of these relationships is Russia’s ties with China. In early February 2022 Russia and China announced a “no limits” partnership and following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine there has been a marked increase in the trade between the two countries. Writing for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Mikhail Korostikov notes that the value of bilateral trade reached a record $190bn last year and increased by another 39 percent in the first quarter of this year compared with the same period in 2022. He notes that Russian raw material exports to China and imports of Chinese goods have sharply increased. Korostikov argues that this is indicative of increased Chinese-Russian cooperation in “all directions” and argues that Russia has been open about seeing Beijing as an alternative centre of power with similar interests and values, which it can rely upon in its confrontation with the West.

In March 2023, China’s President Xi Jinping made a state visit to Russia. Commentators’ perspectives on the visit differ, with some arguing that the visit was a sweeping signal of alignment across a host of issues. Others, however, suggest that it was designed to show cooperation but also the ‘red lines’ which exist in the Chinese-Russian relationship as China continues to court Western economies in the wake of its domestic economic woes. Indeed, President Xi spoke to Ukrainian President Zelenskyy on the telephone in April 2023, the first direct contact between the two leaders since the war began. The Chinese special envoy for Eurasian affairs, Li Hu, also visited Ukraine in May 2023. During that meeting, he said that China was willing to work with other countries to create conditions for a political settlement to the conflict. At the same time, the Ukrainian foreign ministry said that it had been clear to Mr Li that Kyiv would not accept any proposals to end the war that involved losing territory or freezing the conflict.

Russia and China signed further economic trade agreements in May 2023, following a visit to Beijing by Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin. As part of the visit, Mr Mishustin claimed that trade between the two nations could reach $200bn this year.

A UK civil servant specialising in Russia–China relations writing under a pseudonym for the Royal United Service Institute (RUSI) has argued that the strategic alliance has benefitted both sides. Russia has a wealthy and willing trading partner at a time of increasing international isolation, while China has made technological gains from its relations with Russia and buys heavily discounted energy. The author argues that each side also legitimises the other internationally and that there is “little chance of differing interests prising the two countries apart”. Instead, they argue that Western nations should plan on the basis of increasing Chinese-Russian ties, and though a formal alliance seems unlikely, both sides have demonstrated a flexibility driven by adversity that may make such moves closer than anticipated.

3.2 Strategic moves by Russia in Africa and elsewhere

Russia has also sought to build its influence elsewhere in the world, particularly in Africa. For example, writing for the Center for Strategic and International Studies Mathieu Droin and Tina Dolbaia note that Russia has sought to build significant political and economic relationships with African nations:

In addition to strengthening diplomatic ties with African states, the Kremlin has also expanded its economic footprint on the continent. For instance, trade revenue between Russia and African countries almost doubled from $9.9bn in 2013 to $17.7bn by 2021. Grain exports are of particular importance, as nearly 30 percent of Africa’s grain supplies come from Russia. Moscow’s leading trade partners in the region are countries in North Africa—particularly Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco—which together account for approximately 67 percent of Russia’s total trade with the continent. Moscow mainly exports wheat, coal, refined petroleum, and electronics to these states, while importing fruits, sugar, and vegetables.

In addition, the authors argue that Russia’s recent withdrawal from the Black Sea grain deal (covered in more detail in section 4 below) may benefit Moscow’s own grain exports by cutting Kyiv out of the global market and increasing the dependence of a number of African states on Russian grain.

Droin and Dolbaia also note that Russia is the chief arms supplier to Africa, accounting for 40 percent of African imports of major weapons systems between 2018 and 2022. Russian private military companies (PMCs) including the Wagner group are also known to be active in many African countries. Indeed, the Wagner group is accused of significant human rights abuses in Mali and seeking to take advantage of instability in Niger following the recent coup in the country. There have also been allegations that the Wagner group was directly or indirectly involved in the Niger coup itself, and indeed protesters taking to the streets have been seen waving Russian flags. The US is also reportedly worried about similar Russian PMC involvement in other countries in the Sahel region.

The recent actions of the Wagner group in Russia and the death of its leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, are explored in section 4 below.

In other significant recent international moves, in March 2023 Russia agreed a deal with neighbouring Belarus to station tactical nuclear weapons on its territory. In addition, Russia has declared its noncompliance with the New START Treaty, designed to reduce the number of nuclear weapons held by the US and the Russian Federation, and indeed Russia has claimed that the treaty is now suspended. The US has called these actions “irresponsible and unlawful”.

Most recently, on 12 September 2023 North Korean President Kim Jong Un reportedly travelled to Russia to discuss the further provision of weapons to Russian forces fighting in Ukraine.

4. Other recent key developments

4.1 Death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, Head of the Wagner group

On 27 August 2023, after some days of uncertainty, it was confirmed that the head of the Wagner group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, had been killed in a plane crash 185 miles north of Moscow. Also on the flight was Valery Chekalov, Prigozhin’s deputy who was reportedly responsible for Wagner group logistics.

Their deaths followed the short-lived and abortive rebellion launched by the Wagner group in June 2023, when armed mercenary forces launched a mutiny against Russian authorities, including seizing the headquarters of Russia’s Southern Military District in the southern city of Rostov-on-Don and marching toward Moscow. Prigozhin claimed his mutiny was not against President Putin but rather against the military leadership and other advisers who were misleading the president. However, following reports that the aircraft in which he was travelling was hit by a missile, many commentators have argued that the incident was President Putin’s revenge for the mutiny (though have some have claimed it may have also been for financial reasons). The Russian authorities have claimed to have had no involvement in the crash and in an interview on 24 August 2023 President Putin expressed his condolences to the families of the victims. However, he also said that Prigozhin was a “talented businessman” with a “complicated fate” who had made “serious mistakes in his life”.

The Wagner group has played a significant role in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The Congressional Research Service notes that the group’s role became more prominent around mid-2022, after the Russian military’s initial failure to achieve key objectives.” The Congressional Research Service also notes that Wagner has been linked to numerous instances of potential war crimes and human rights violations in Ukraine, even against its own personnel.

Joana de deus Pereira, a senior research fellow at RUSI, has said that the Wagner group will “probably cease to exist” in its current form because of Prigozhin’s death. However, she said that the organisation itself “will continue to operate and morph and probably will appear with another branding, with a facelift”. She added that the “operations, the core operations in Africa, they will continue”.

4.2 Latest on the Black Sea grain deal

As noted above, Russia has withdrawn from the Black Sea grain initiative, a deal brokered by Turkey and the UN in July 2022 to enable Ukraine to export grain by sea despite the war. It was accompanied by an agreement to facilitate Russia’s own exports of food and fertiliser, which Moscow claims has not been fulfilled. As a result, the initiative was not renewed after its third term, which expired on 17 July 2023.

Despite recent attempts by the UN to revive the deal, including at the recent G20 summit in India, Russia has resisted calls to re-join the agreement. Since the expiration of the deal, Russia has also launched a series of air attacks on Ukraine’s ports, destroying thousands of tonnes of grain. Since the end of the deal, BBC News reports that Ukrainian wheat exports have remained reasonably high, but exports of maize have fallen significantly. The UK’s Agriculture and Horticulture Development Board says 65% of Ukraine’s grain exports are now going from the ports of Izmail and Reni, on the Danube. The grain is then transported by river and canals into the Black Sea, via the Romanian ports of Sulina and Constanta. In January 2023, only 20% of Ukraine’s grain was being exported this way. BBC News also reports that Russia has repeatedly attacked Izmail and Reni with drones to try and disrupt operations.

4.3 Drone attacks on Russian territory

Drone warfare has been a critical component of the war in Ukraine since the invasion began in February 2022. Both sides have made extensive use of drone technology. However, in recent months Ukraine has shown an increasing willingness and capability to strike targets deep inside Russia. According to BBC Verify there have more than 190 suspected drone strikes in 2023 in Russia and in Russian-annexed Crimea, including in Moscow and the Russian city of Pskov, more than 434 miles from the Ukrainian border (and which Ukrainian officials have said was targeted from inside Russia). At the same time, Russian drone and missile strikes on Ukrainian towns and cities have continued. From 24 February 2022 to 13 August 2023, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has recorded 26,384 civilian casualties in the country.

4.4 Recent changes to senior Ukrainian and Russian military/diplomatic postholders

Recent months have also seen significant changes in personnel on both sides of the conflict. Senior Russian military commanders involved in the Ukrainian invasion have been changed or rotated several times since the beginning of the war. Most recently, Russian General Sergei Surovikin, who at one time was commander of Russia’s war effort in Ukraine, has reportedly been dismissed as head of the country’s aerospace forces. General Surovikin was implicated in the Wagner group mutiny of June 2023 and has not been seen in public since the aborted coup.

On the Ukrainian side of the conflict, President Zelenskyy dismissed Ukraine’s ambassador to London Vadym Prystaiko on 21 July 2023. Mr Prystaiko’s dismissal was announced in a presidential order, with no official reason being given. However, the Guardian noted that it followed diplomatic tensions between the UK and Ukraine over remarks that Ukraine should be “more grateful for the military help the West was providing”.

On 3 September 2023, Ukraine also announced that the defence minister, Oleksiy Reznikov, would be replaced, the highest-level official to depart since the beginning of the war. The new defence minister, Rustem Umerov, a former head of the State Property Fund, was appointed on 6 September 2023. Though he reportedly enjoyed good relationships with Ukraine’s international partners, Mr Reznikov was reportedly removed as a result of several scandals which have occurred during his tenure. These included the news that the Ukrainian defence ministry had been procuring goods for its soldiers at above market prices.

5. Future of the conflict in Ukraine

Opinions differ on how the war in Ukraine will progress, and ultimately end, though many experts agree that it will be determined to an extent by the success of the present counteroffensive.

James Nixey, director of the Russia and Eurasia programme at Chatham House, suggests there are “worrying signs” that some of Ukraine’s Western supporters want to prepare the ground for a negotiated settlement between Russia and Ukraine. In the US in particular, Nixey argues that such talk is no longer confined to former president Donald Trump and his allies but is now being discussed by some in the Biden administration. For Nixey, pushing Ukraine to negotiate now would be “disastrous”.  He argues that, while the urge to find an end to the conflict is “understandable, ostensibly reasonable and often well-intentioned”, no part of Russia’s argument contains reasonable grounds for compromise. Instead, he argues that to help the “slower-than-desired offensive”, the West should accede to Ukraine’s wish list—not least for longer-range weaponry that can reach behind front lines, including into Russian territory. Further, Nixey argues that raising negotiations at this stage “can only suggest a lack of belief in a Ukrainian victory on the part of Ukraine’s supporters” and an unwillingness to stay the course. It would also confirm to Russia the limits of the West’s resolve.

A similar argument is put forward by Judy Demsey, senior fellow at Carnegie Europe. She argues that Europe needs to rapidly increase its military support for Ukraine, contending that negotiations can only begin if Ukraine “is in a strong enough position to set the terms”. For Demsey, those terms are not just about restoring Ukraine’s territorial integrity. They are about ensuring that Russia does not attack or threaten Kyiv again. An end to the war is about ending Russia’s imperial ambitions in this part of Europe. She argues that the NATO summit in July was a missed opportunity:

During the Vilnius summit in July, NATO threw away the opportunity to act courageously and with conviction. Ukraine should have been offered membership there and then. The security guarantees that were offered instead have not been ironed out.

The United States and Germany led the opposition to Ukraine joining NATO on the grounds that it would lead to more escalation by Russia, or even to a world war. As it is, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine already has global implications, for energy, for food supplies, and for global alliances, including China’s support for Russia. In short, the war in Ukraine is not confined to Ukraine.

Some news outlets such as Politico Europe have reported that some US officials are preparing for a “frozen conflict that lasts many years—perhaps decades”. Politico alleges that provisional discussions within the Biden administration have included a potential long-term “freeze”, including where to set potential lines that Ukraine and Russia would agree not to cross but which would not constitute official borders. Politico argues that this scenario has become more likely as the Ukrainian counteroffensive appears incapable of delivering a “mortal blow” to Russian forces.

A similar argument is put forward by the International Crisis Group (ICG), which notes the practical challenges to delivering Ukraine’s stated intention of reclaiming all of its territory, including those areas held by Russia since 2014. Writing in July 2023, the ICG argued that, even if the Ukrainian counteroffensive succeeded in breaking through to the Sea of Azov, severing the land supply route between Russian forces, significant obstacles would remain:

One is the question of how [Ukraine] would retake Crimea, which Moscow has held since 2014 and which hosts Russia’s Black Sea fleet. A blockade of the peninsula, possible only if Ukraine regains substantial land in the south, might be one way. It would limit escalation risks by avoiding a frontal Ukrainian assault on territory that—while unquestionably Kyiv’s under international law—is both highly prized and claimed by the Kremlin. (Ukraine already engages in shelling and missile strikes and these would presumably continue). This tactic could additionally offer negotiating leverage with Moscow. But a blockade would be tremendously difficult, militarily and logistically. It would also risk grave humanitarian impact, while leaving the peninsula in Russia’s hands.

Another problem is Russia. Despite the mutiny by the head of the Wagner private military company Yevgeny Prigozhin on 23–24 June, the Russian military still appears cohesive—and has just been promised a pay raise. There is no guarantee that Ukrainian military successes in themselves would be enough to achieve Russia’s defeat on the terms Kyiv seeks. However far Kyiv gets, it runs the risk that Russia responds not with negotiation or capitulation, but with obstinacy, regrouping and looking to fight again, including with attacks across the border and airstrikes throughout Ukraine.

Consequently, the ICG argues that there is a second version of how Ukraine sees victory. This narrative is about the transformation of Russia, up to and including the country’s collapse and a change in its government. The ICG is clear that this is not official policy in Kyiv or Western capitals. However, the ICG argues that Ukrainian officials and several Western experts with ties to their governments “say peace is impossible absent fundamental change in Moscow”. Some harbour hopes of the Russian government’s downfall, though this “does not include the Biden administration, which has taken pains to make clear that such an outcome is neither its aim nor its desire”. The ICG also notes that on the one hand the failed Wagner mutiny indicates the Kremlin can withstand shocks. On the other, “it makes clear that internal turmoil is more plausible than Moscow seems to have anticipated”. Ultimately the ICG concludes that such a scenario is beyond the power of Western governments to ultimately determine and therefore is not a useful planning parameter for the future of the conflict.

6. Read more

• House of Lords Library, ‘The situation in Ukraine’, 2 February 2023
• House of Commons Library, ‘Military assistance to Ukraine since the Russian invasion’, 14 August 2023
• US Congressional Research Service, ‘Russia’s war against Ukraine: Related CRS products’, updated 28 July 2023

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Cover image by TheDigitalWay on Pixabay.