Defence spending, NATO and nuclear weapons in 1985

Approximate read time: 10 minutes

On 26 June 1985, the parliamentary under secretary of state for the armed forces, Lord Trefgarne, opened a take note debate in the House of Lords about the Conservative government’s statement on the defence estimates white paper (Cmnd 9430). The House of Commons had already approved the statement following debates across two days earlier in the month.

In his introductory remarks, Lord Trefgarne noted defence was “unique” in that “no other single component” of government spending was “subject to annual reports to Parliament and to the taxpayer” through the defence estimates.^[1] He said: “This is as it should be. It reflects the importance that successive governments have attached to the maintenance of the country’s security—the first and greatest responsibility of all governments”. However, he added:

But defence does not come cheap. In the financial year 1985–86, we are planning to spend over £18bn on defence [the Institute for Fiscal Studies estimated this as 4.3% of GDP].^[2] This is a huge sum of money. And it is of course true that spending money on defence means forgoing expenditure on something else—expenditure to which, in an ideal world, we should all like to give priority.^[3]

He reminded the House about the “realities of today”, and referenced the Soviet Union, an ally during the second world war, that he said had now “turned the searchlight of its hostility on the West as a whole”. The minister said that since the war the Soviet Union had “lost no opportunity to extend its political and military powerbase”.

He also said the government remained “committed to maintaining a substantial contribution in all four areas of NATO commitment, as well as our activities outside the NATO area”. For example, Lord Trefgarne said the government was committed to replacing Polaris, the UK’s existing nuclear programme, with Trident.^[4] Trident, he said, would cost on average 3 percent of the defence budget and 6 percent of the equipment budget. The minister acknowledged the capital costs of the Trident programme would be comparatively large but said the running costs would be “small”.

He said critics had focused on the government ending, after 1985–86, its commitment to annual real increases in defence spending in line with the 3 percent NATO target. However, Lord Trefgarne argued:

The statement describes the massive increase that the government have provided in the resources devoted to defence. It describes the measures we are taking to ensure that these resources are used as efficiently and as effectively as possible. It reaffirms our commitment to realistic measures of arms control and disarmament; and it sets our defence policies and capabilities firmly in the context of our commitment to NATO and our determination to maintain the strength and credibility of the alliance.^[5]

Lord Boston of Faversham spoke on behalf of the opposition.^[6] He noted there had been press reports suggesting there would be a shortfall in spending on defence. He said that strain on the defence budget would come at a time when the need for conventional weapons build-up and investing in Trident was at its peak. On costs, he noted the government’s estimates of Trident’s cost, but pointed out that “in the years of highest costs—and we are just approaching those—it will be taking 15 percent to 20 percent of total capital spending on defence”.^[7] Among Lord Boston’s other concerns was the decreasing size of the merchant fleet, which he said in tonnage terms had halved in five years, with the number of ships down from 1,297 to 758.

The merchant fleet aspect was picked up by Lord Kennet, who spoke on behalf of the Liberal/Social Democrat alliance. He noted that NATO fleets collectively were “down from 206mn to 184mn tonnes in 10 years”, with the “principal merchant shipping powers—Norway, Britain and, to a lesser extent, France […] rocketing down”. He contrasted this with the Soviet Union, which was “up from 16mn tonnes in 1975 to 23mn tonnes now”. He added this excluded the “astronomical and well-known growth of its fishing fleet and all the other disguised military capabilities which it has at sea”. Lord Kennet argued:

If our shipping and shipbuilding industries vanish, not only will it have an immediate effect too obvious to be spelt out on our preparedness for a major political crisis and the possibility of war, but other industries and national capabilities will vanish with them.^[8]

Crossbench peer Lord Carver, chief of defence staff between 1973 and 1976, thought that any government would struggle to provide the necessary resources for defence.^[9] He identified two factors—the high living standards people expect and the “electronic revolution”—that he said “combine to exert a tight grip on the resources the nation is prepared to devote to defence”.^[10] He wondered “why do the government obstinately persist in wasting money on a so-called British independent deterrent?”.^[11] He argued that the UK’s deterrent was not essential to NATO’s strategy and was consequently “superfluous and a waste of money”.^[12]

Former Labour minister Lord Shinwell reminded the House about his longstanding interest in defence policy, which went “as far back as the Boer war, the first world war and the second world war”.^[13] He thought maintaining the UK’s own nuclear deterrent was the right thing for a government to do. Lord Gladwyn (Liberal) said he was concerned about US President Ronald Reagan’s strategic defence initiative (SDI), known as ‘star wars’.^[14] He feared the initiative would jeopardise ongoing arms talks because were the US to invest in such a defence shield the Soviet Union may do likewise. Lord Zuckerman (Crossbench), who was the first government chief scientific adviser, asked about the prospect of a ‘brain drain’ of UK scientists to the US to work on the SDI.^[15]

Lord Stewart of Fulham (Labour), a former foreign secretary, spoke in support of continued nuclear deterrence.^[16] He dismissed the notion the UK could give up its own weapons to support its European allies retaining theirs. He said: “I should not care to be the British foreign secretary who had to argue that singularly inglorious policy in front of the NATO Council”.^[17] He said defence spending was “something in which we are all involved and of which everybody ought to pay their share. It is time that the government made that clear”. Viscount Mersey (Conservative) expressed concern about the international build-up of conventional weapons. He thought this trend was more likely to cause a third world war than nuclear weapons.^[18] Lord Jenkins of Putney (Labour) criticised the narrative of the strategic context set out in the defence estimates.^[19] He said it was “so oblivious of anything other than a narrow Western point of view as to be almost laughable”. He thought that the United States’ build-up of pre-emptive weapons could be copied by the Soviet Union. Were that the case, “far from making us safe, Trident could be our death warrant”.^[20]

Former prime minister Lord Home of Hirsel (Conservative) said he remained “firmly in support of the government’s policy of retaining a British nuclear capacity”.^[21] First, because the UK needed to “see much more clearly than we can today the future pattern of power relationships in the world”.^[22] And second, because of credibility. He thought the UK would not be at the negotiating table “if we had no nuclear weapon at all” but “with Trident we shall be there, and we shall have something of substance to contribute both to discussion and, we would hope, to solution”. Lord Home said he doubted “if there is any security in a balance of conventional forces”.

Lord Mayhew spoke on behalf the Liberal/Social Democrat alliance. He said the government and its European allies should try to persuade the US to agree a mutual ban with the Soviet Union of the development and deployment of space-based anti-ballistic missiles. He thought European nations should also distance themselves from the SDI.^[23] Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos wound up for the opposition. He said that defence spending had once again been subject to “the annual argument between the Treasury and the Ministry of Defence”.^[24] He pointed out that defence spending constituted “the highest expenditure among the big European members of the [NATO] alliance. That has been the case indeed for the past 40 years”. He noted that whilst the UK was supposedly in budgetary deficit in the European Community “when we have our NATO hat on we are assumed to have a bottomless purse and are expected to make the biggest contribution of any country in NATO”. Lord Cledwyn said “our primary role—the role to which Britain is now suited—should be in NATO, working in the closest co-operation with our European allies and making a continuing and more effective contribution to the conventional defence of Western Europe”.^[25]

Leader of the House Viscount Whitelaw responded for the government. Among the answers he gave to points raised in the debate, Lord Whitelaw acknowledged that whilst the 3 percent NATO spending target would not continue, the “task now is to make better use of the significant extra funds which the government have made available through a vigorous pursuit of the efficiency programme”.^[26]

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Cover image: Crown copyright, Ministry of Defence, Air Historical Branch (Royal Air Force).