The Arctic’s strategic importance

Approximate read time: 10 minutes

The Arctic is the northernmost region of Earth.^[1] Eight countries have territory within the region: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States. These countries form the Arctic Council, an intergovernmental forum “promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic states, Arctic indigenous peoples and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues” (such as environmental protection).^[2] The United Kingdom participates as an observer.

1. Strategic importance

The region’s strategic importance largely stems from its location and resources.^[3] The Arctic sits at the junction of major northern approaches between Asia, Europe and North America, making it central to global security planning. Several countries maintain a military presence across the region, reflecting its role in early warning systems, missile defence and space surveillance infrastructure. At the same time, rising temperatures and shrinking sea ice are increasing the accessibility of potential shipping routes, including the Northern Sea route and the northwest passage. The Arctic also contains reserves of oil, gas, rare earth elements and other critical minerals, further contributing to its geopolitical significance.

2. United States

US longstanding interest in the Arctic focuses on defence, resources and strategic positioning. Approximately 15 percent of the Arctic region lies within US territory (Alaska).^[4] The US has maintained a military presence in the region since the second world war, most notably at Pituffik Space Base in Greenland (formerly Thule Air Base), which supports missile warning and space surveillance systems.

President Trump has recently said the US needs to acquire Greenland for national security reasons.^[5] In a recent article for the London School of Economics and Political Science’s European Politics Blog, Klaus Dodds, interim dean of the science and technology faculty at Middlesex University London, said President Trump’s interest in Greenland was driven by several factors.^[6] He noted that the president had cited national security as the primary justification, viewing the territory as a potential “staging ground” for high-latitude missile and space defence and expressing concerns that “Denmark cannot be trusted with the defence of the island”. Mr Dodds also highlighted Greenland’s mineral resource potential, including rare earth elements. He suggested that “a resource calculation in Washington DC has been done”, particularly considering Chinese investment in the Arctic.

Carly Cooperman and Douglas E Schoen, pollsters at the public opinion company Schoen Cooperman Research, described President Trump’s dispute with NATO and Europe over Greenland as “significant”.^[7] In an article for The Hill in January 2026, citing polling, the authors noted that 86 percent of Americans opposed using the military to take Greenland and that approval of Trump’s handling of foreign relations had fallen to 39 percent. They warned that the United States risked “pushing allies closer to China”, forcing Europe to “divest” from the American economy and could lead to the “degradation” of NATO, which they described as the “ultimate gift” to China and Russia.

Otto Svendsen, an associate fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) warned that although President Trump views US ownership of the territory as an “absolute necessity”, any US attempt to seize Greenland by force or coercion would be an “unforced error”.^[8] Mr Svendsen argued that US national security objectives could be met through continued engagement with Denmark and Greenland, noting recent Danish defence investments and Greenland’s reported interest in deepening ties with the US. He also stated that ownership was “not a prerequisite” for US access to minerals, with Greenland expressing a “willingness” in its 2024 foreign, security and defence strategy to remove trade barriers with the US. The article added that “shared strategic interests and skilful diplomatic efforts” between Denmark, Greenland and the US had “already boxed out” Russia and China from the territory.

Despite this, the author noted “fissures” between Greenland and Denmark, potentially accelerating Greenland’s independence policy. He also noted that if the US imposed economic costs on Denmark, the EU could deploy its “trade defence arsenal” in response. Lastly, he argued that by previously refusing to rule out the use of force against Denmark, there were now doubts about the US’s “willingness to stand by its NATO allies”. He concluded that the US would be better served by strengthening ties with Greenland through diplomatic forums, targeted aid, and support for Greenland’s growing role in regional security.

3. Russia

Russia also views the Arctic region as a core national interest and has expanded its military infrastructure along its northern coastline in recent years. The region accounts for more than a quarter of Russia’s territory.^[9] Russia’s Arctic coastline (which extends over 24,150km) represents 53 percent of the Arctic Ocean coastline. Data from the Simons Foundation, a Canadian non-profit organisation that monitors Arctic security, noted that Russia maintains 30 of the 66 major military bases across the Arctic.^[10]

In an article for the Atlantic Council in April 2025, Bohdan Ustymenko, director of Ukraine’s National Security Institute, argued that Russia’s Arctic policy reflects a broader maritime strategy aimed at “expanding its influence on the international stage” and furthering control over the Northern Sea shipping route (this is the shortest shipping route between Europe and the Pacific).^[11] He noted that President Putin ordered the establishment of a Russian maritime collegium in 2024, led by former FSB security service director Nikolai Patrushev, at a time when Russia faced accusations of hostile naval activities, including undersea cable sabotage and surveillance near NATO states. He argued that Russia’s militarisation along the route, combined with its “deepening regional involvement” with China and both countries’ interest in Arctic trade and resources, could further heighten geopolitical tensions. He warned that ports along the route could become “increasingly important for the projection of Chinese and Russian naval power on the international stage”. He said this could enable both countries to “enforce their claims” to Arctic resources and could overwhelm other nations with less powerful navies, such as Canada, Denmark and Norway.

Others have cited military power and resources as one of Russia’s goals for the region. In an article for the European Council on Foreign Relations, published in May 2025, Mikhail Komin and Joanna Hosa argued that Russia’s Arctic policy was shaped by “insecurities” over its military position and future access to gas and oil.^[12] They stated that Russia’s main military concern relates to its nuclear deterrent, noting that a significant share of its nuclear arsenal was deployed on Arctic-based submarines that must remain undetected. However, melting ice and the development of “modern acoustic and radar methods” have increased the risk of detection, increasing their vulnerability. The authors added that the loss of sea ice has also created broader security concerns, with Russia’s northern coastline “losing its natural defence barrier”. They noted that Russia therefore increasingly fears this could weaken its northern fleet’s ability to deter a Western attack, prompting “further militarisation”.

Economically, the authors noted that Russia is concerned about threats to its ability to extract oil and gas, which country officials have described as the “resource base of the 21st century”. Komin and Hosa highlighted that approximately 80 percent of Russia’s natural gas and 17 percent of its oil reserves are located within the Russian Arctic zone. They argued that EU and US sanctions imposed since 2014 were a “targeted blow” to Russia’s ability to develop these reserves, halting major joint ventures and restricting access to advanced drilling equipment, which the Kremlin “saw as clearly aggressive”. The authors argued that these developments reinforced “a sense of strategic vulnerability and paranoia” among Russian officials, who believe the West is “pursuing a policy of taking Russia’s natural resources”. Therefore, they described Russia’s approach as a “policy iceberg”, with “massive economic investment” forming the “visible tip”, attempts to create a Northern Sea trade route the “buoy at the waterline”, and with militarisation “submerged from view” and “most threatening to Western interests”.

Eva Hartog has examined how Russian officials had responded to President Trump’s Greenland policy.^[13] In an article for Politico in January 2026, the author noted that Russia had appeared to be using the situation to “weaken Western unity” and to divert President Trump’s attention away from issues, such as Ukraine. She also noted remarks from Russia’s foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, who stated that the fallout between the US, EU and NATO had reduced “prospects of preserving NATO as a unified Western military-political bloc”. Additionally, she highlighted comments from pro-Russian commentators, including Vladimir Kornilov, who stated that Russia should “let them tear each other apart”.

4. China

China has described itself as a “near-Arctic state” and has invested in infrastructure projects, mining proposals and research stations across the region.^[14]

Some commentators have argued that these activities form part of a coordinated approach to build long-term influence. In an article for Chatham House in October 2025, Katja Bego, a senior research fellow, stated that China had used research collaboration, including with European countries, and investments in Arctic research stations and space infrastructure to “add credibility to its claim that it is a near-Arctic power”.^[15] She argued that Europe’s slow development of its own Arctic “economic footprint” had “opened the door to actors with fewer scruples, such as China”. She also highlighted concerns that infrastructure roll-out was almost always “dual-use”, allowing countries that owned such assets to increase their security position in this “highly strategic region”. The article claimed that China’s bigger ambitions centre on new shipping routes to Europe, which provide Europe with “leverage and the ability to have a say in how these new routes should develop”. She warned that Europe must use this leverage to not allow the Northern Sea route to evolve on Russia and China’s terms. The article concluded that Europe has work to do to formulate an Arctic strategy that considered security and economic security interests. She said NATO “does not have a High North strategy at all” and that the EU has not updated its Arctic strategy since 2021. She therefore called for a new strategy enabling Europe to “project power, spur (sustainable) development and deter escalation in a region, and world, where economic statecraft and security are increasingly enmeshed”.

Miles Yu, a professor of East Asia and military and naval history at the United States naval academy and a former policy adviser on China to then US secretary of state Mike Pompeo, characterised China’s recent Arctic activity as a “disciplined campaign”.^[16] In an article for the Washington Times in January 2026, he said it involved diplomatic engagement, economic projects and scientific research aimed at “building durable leverage” in the region. He noted concerns among US policymakers and analysts that China may be embedding strategic capabilities in the Arctic under the cover of research. He highlighted the China–Iceland Arctic Observatory in Karholl, saying it was an example cited by a US House select committee as a potential “dual-use” activity on the territory of a NATO ally. He concluded that while the outright purchase of Greenland was one option for the US, alternative arrangements existed, such as long-term leases granting the US exclusive defence and infrastructure rights. However, he argued that any such agreement should aim to prevent Chinese “entrenchment” in the region and ensure that NATO’s northern flank was “strong enough that deterrence does not melt with the ice”.

The Economist has examined recent Chinese activity in the Arctic.^[17] In an article published in February 2026, it noted that China had celebrated a “banner year” in the Arctic in 2025, after a Chinese ice-breaker ship had completed the country’s largest Arctic expedition and a Chinese-operated container ship made what Chinese media described as the “fastest delivery in the history of container shipping”. The Economist argued that this contrasted with comments by Chinese Arctic researchers at the annual China-Nordic Arctic Research Center conference in early February 2026, who said that the Arctic was “not among China’s foreign policy priorities”. The article added that the EU and NATO were increasing scrutiny of China’s Arctic engagement because of its relationship with Russia and its “earlier, more aggressive Arctic approach”, detailing proposed investments such as three airports in Greenland. The article highlighted remarks by General Alexus Grynkewich, NATO’s top commander in Europe, who warned in January 2026 that China was “not studying the seals and the polar bears”. The Economist concluded that “until China reviews its Kremlin ties, its outreach to other Arctic states will meet an icy response”.

5. Read more

• House of Commons Library, ‘UK defence: Renewed interest in the Arctic’, 2 March 2026
• House of Commons Library, ‘President Trump and Greenland: Frequently asked questions’, 23 January 2026
• Klaus Dodds, ‘As the Arctic warms up, the race to control the region is growing even hotter’, The Conversation, 9 January 2026
• Katya Adler, ‘Tensions rise as superpowers scrap for a piece of the Arctic’, BBC News, 23 May 2025

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