The House of Lords is due to debate the situation in Ukraine on 9 February 2023.

1. The state of the conflict

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine began on 24 February 2022, described by President Putin as a ‘special military operation’. By 22 March 2022 it was estimated that—including Crimea and parts of Donbas held by Russian-backed separatists in advance of the invasion—Russian forces occupied over a quarter of Ukrainian territory.

Ukraine has since regained large amounts of land, in part through a series of rapid counteroffensives in September. A New York Times analysis of data provided by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW)—a key source of information about the war that it is heavily utilised by western media outlets—suggests that Ukraine has reclaimed over half of the land captured by Russia since it invaded in February 2022. Nevertheless, the ISW estimates that Russian forces still occupy more than 100,000 square kilometres of Ukraine, over 15% of its total territory.

Since the Ukrainian counteroffensives in September, the frontlines of the conflict have remained broadly stable, with remaining Russian-held territory concentrated in the east of Ukraine. Russia appears to have made some marginal gains in Donbas, its first advance of any note since the summer, but this has been at the cost of large numbers of casualties.

The recent stability of the frontlines is consistent with the US director of national intelligence’s expectations that the war would continue at “reduced tempo” during the winter months.

2. The consequences of the conflict

2.1 Humanitarian impact

The humanitarian cost of the conflict for Ukraine’s population has been severe. Most obviously, large numbers of people have been displaced. The UN figures record around eight million Ukrainian refugees across Europe, with around six million people internally displaced within Ukraine itself.

Those remaining in Ukraine remain at physical risk from Russian missile and drone attacks. In total, the UN estimates that there have been around 18,000 confirmed civilian casualties, with around 7,000 killed and 11,000 injured, and that the real figure is likely to be considerably higher.

The casualties are often collateral damage from Russian strikes at Ukrainian power stations, transmission lines and other key infrastructure objects. These attacks have left over 40% of Ukraine’s power system damaged, leading to regular blackouts and pleas from the government for people to limit their energy use.

Ukrainian households are also at the centre of what has been described as a global food crisis. As of 1 February 2023, approximately 35% of Ukraine’s population was estimated to be suffering from insufficient food consumption, a figure which has increased 11 percentage points in the last three months, according to figures from the UN’s World Food Programme.

2.2 Economic impact

The economic impact of the war has been severe, not least due to the extensive damage caused to Ukraine’s productive assets and infrastructure and the way the war has dislocated the labour force. The Ukrainian minister of economic development has said that around 47% of Ukrainian companies have stopped operating. The finance ministry estimates that the economy shrank by around 30% in 2022.

This decline of private sector activity has led to a sharp fall in tax revenue which, combined with budgetary pressure for financing military spending, has created significant financial pressure on the Ukrainian government. In 2022, the government relied on the National Bank of Ukraine financing its budget deficit, but this has contributed to the depreciation of its currency, the hryvnia, and a significant rise in prices. The Ministry of Economy reported that inflation was 27% in 2022.

Going forwards, Ukraine is hoping to reduce macroeconomic instability by fully financing its budget through a combination of donor support, IMF assistance and debt issuance.

3. Support for Ukraine

3.1 UK support

Security cooperation has been a key part of the UK’s bilateral relationship with Ukraine since its independence in 1991, with the UK stepping up its support in the aftermath of Russia’s annexation of Crimea. In late 2014 the UK began providing Ukraine with non-lethal military equipment, before launching a training programme for Ukraine’s armed forces (Operation Orbital) in early 2015. Boris Johnson’s government positioned itself as one of Ukraine’s key allies in the lead-up to the conflict, being one of the first countries to provide defensive lethal aid in January 2022 in anticipation of Russia’s invasion.

As the war has progressed the UK’s aid has continued to provide military support, as well as providing financial assistance to support the purchase of military equipment. Military equipment provided by the UK includes defensive lethal weaponry, such as anti-tank missiles, artillery, air defence systems, armoured fighting vehicles, antistructure munitions, and three long-range multiple launch rocket systems. In addition, it has provided non-lethal aid, such as body armour and helmets, and established a long-term training programme for the Ukrainian armed forces (Operation Interflex), with the potential to train up to 10,000 new and existing Ukrainian soldiers every 120 days.

The UK has also created a sponsorship scheme enabling over 110,000 Ukrainian refugees to come to the UK. The scheme is predicated on an initial six-month sponsorship period; however, the Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities Michael Gove announced several updates to the scheme on 14 December 2022 to incentivise the extension of sponsorship by host households.

The UK’s support for Ukraine has remained consistent despite the two changes of government. Liz Truss’s government stated in September 2022 that military aid provided in 2023 would at least match that provided in 2022. On 16 January 2023 Rishi Sunak’s government announced what the secretary of state for defence described as “the most significant package of combat power to date”, including a squadron of the UK’s Challenger 2 tanks.

The UK’s position on Ukraine also has cross-party support. Leader of the Opposition Keir Starmer has described the Labour party’s support for Ukraine’s sovereignty as “unrelenting” and that the “UK remains totally united in the face of Russian aggression”.

3.2 Other international support

In addition to the UK, Ukraine has been provided with military, financial and humanitarian assistance by a range of allies. According to the Kiel Institute’s Ukraine Support Tracker, approximately €113bn worth of support across the board has been committed to Ukraine. In terms of magnitude, EU member states and institutions and the US are the largest donors.

EU member states and institutions have committed to around €52bn worth of support, the largest part of which is financial support. This includes a recently announced €18bn package, which is designed to help Ukraine meet its financing gap and fund essential public services throughout 2023.

The US has committed €48bn worth of support. This includes significant contributions of financial and humanitarian aid, in addition to €23bn of military assistance. This makes the US by far the largest bilateral donor of military aid.

The hosting of refugees has also been a major undertaking, particularly for EU countries neighbouring Ukraine. Poland has taken in over 1.5 million refugees alone and the refugee costs in Baltic and eastern European countries surrounding Ukraine are typically in the range of 0.5 to 1.0% of gross domestic product (GDP).

3.3 The debate surrounding military aid

There has been a debate amongst Ukraine’s allies about exactly what type of military equipment it would be appropriate to provide. As was widely reported, Germany had initially been reluctant to provide tanks to Ukraine. German chancellor Olaf Scholz was reportedly concerned about the escalatory risk of such a move.

On 25 January 2023 it was agreed that Germany would send 14 tanks to Ukraine as part of a joint agreement with the US, which has agreed to send 31 of its own. The agreement also provided permission to countries such as Poland to send a selection of its own German-produced tanks. Days later Poland announced it would be sending 60 more of its own domestically produced tanks. The UK had already announced it would send 14 of its tanks as part of the package of military aid announced on 16 January 2023.

The supplying of tanks to Ukraine is thought to be significant, but the debate about tanks can be seen as part of a wider question as to whether Ukraine’s allies can provide the kind of offensive weaponry President Zelensky has said it would need in order to de-occupy its territory:

The courage of our military and motivation of the Ukrainian people are not enough against thousands of tanks of the Russian Federation. We need appropriate weapons: we need to have either a large number of artillery systems or an appropriate, adequate number of tanks […] Speed and time are important. The sooner we can de-occupy our territory, the sooner we can be more powerful, the more citizens our country will save.

At the start of the conflict in March 2022, the UK secretary of state for defence, Ben Wallace, said that everything the UK did “is bound by the decision to supply defensive systems and is calibrated not to escalate to a strategic level”. Announcing the decision to provide Challenger 2 tanks in January 2023 in the House of Commons, Mr Wallace said:

In December I told the House that I was “developing options” to respond to Russia’s continued aggression in a “calibrated and determined manner”. Today I can announce the most significant package of combat power to date to accelerate Ukrainian success.

Mr Wallace said that the announcements would help Ukraine retake occupied territory:

Today’s package is an important increase in Ukraine’s capabilities. It means they can go from resisting to expelling Russian forces from Ukrainian soil.

There has also been debate on the potential donation of fighter jets. It has been reported that the US and the UK have ruled this out, with the UK saying it would not be practical citing the training required to fly them. Sky News has reported that the Netherlands have said they would consider donating fighter jets and that a “top Ukrainian official” had said Ukraine had received “positive signals” from Poland.

4. The future of the conflict

The prospects for a peaceful resolution to the conflict any time soon appear limited. In comments made on 30 January 2023, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg noted that Russia was “preparing for more war”, rather than peace, and on 26 January 2023 Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said he is “not interested” in peace talks, as the Russian president cannot be trusted.

Attention is currently focussed on the possibility of an imminent Russian offensive. The head of Ukraine’s armed forces has suggested that Russia is likely to make another attempt to retake Kyiv. Ukraine’s defence minister has suggested that such an attack may be timed to coincide with the anniversary of Russia’s initial invasion (24 February).

The extent to which Russian forces are prepared for a major offensive is unclear. Russian ammunition stocks are reportedly running low. In December 2022, Reuters quoted a senior US military official as saying that Russian forces had resorted to using 40-year old artillery shells in recent battles, as well as having reached out to countries such as Iran and North Korea to help replenish stocks. In January 2023, the Financial Times reported that recent mobilisation efforts also appear to have relied on recruiting convicts to fight for the Wagner Group—a Russian paramilitary mercenary organisation—which has reportedly sustained large losses while fighting in Donbas.

Nevertheless, the ISW suggests that a renewed Russian offensive remains the “most likely course of action”, an assessment it says is supported by Western, Ukrainian and Russian intelligence sources.

Ukraine is also thought to be preparing its own renewed offensive, although it is being advised by US officials to hold off launching this until the latest round of weaponry supplied by the US and other allies is in place and training has been provided.

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Cover image by jorono from Pixabay.